METHODOLOGY

Since the decennial census population figures are accurate as of April 1 in each census year, the VAP Burnham dataset calculates the difference in the required census figures between a base census year and the same figures as reported in the following census. To estimate the voting age population for the years between the censuses, the difference between them is simply multiplied by the number of months that have passed beyond April 1 of the base year and then added to the base year figure. For example, to arrive at the April 1, 1992, voting age population, the difference between the April 1, 1990, census population and the April 1, 2000, census population is multiplied by 24/120ths (for the 24 out of 120 months between the census counts) and added to the April 1, 1990, figure.

The process for arriving at the CSAE November eligible figures is the same, except that the data are projected forward to November instead of April. To accomplish this, the multiplier is simply changed to the number of months that have passed since April of the base census year. For instance, to calculate the November 1996 voting age population, the difference between April 1, 1990, and April 1, 2000, is multiplied by 79/120ths and added to the April 1, 1990, count. The same interpolation process is applied to the decennial census counts of noncitizens of voting age in each state. Once estimates of the total voting age population and the non-citizen voting age population for each state have been calculated, the noncitizen figure is simply subtracted from the total to arrive at the appropriate figure.

Since the last decennial census occurred in 2000, it is necessary to project the figures forward to arrive at the voting age population for 2002 and 2004. To accomplish this, the difference between the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses is used to establish a rate of growth. This rate of growth is then used to project forward based on the number of months passed since April 1990 out of the 120 months between the censuses. For instance, to obtain the voting age population for April 2004, the difference between April 1, 1990, and April 1, 2000, is multiplied by 168/120 and added to the April 1, 1990, total.

3. The votes that are counted in this report for the 2008 general election are unofficial results from the several states that are compiled and distributed by the Associated Press as of 7 p.m. Wednesday, November 5, 2008. The comparisons in the charts are with the final, official, and certified votes for previous presidential elections (or more precisely the accurate and verified percentage of eligible citizens who voted—since raw vote comparisons are usually meaningless as the population grows each year). These comparisons are not without problems. By the evening after Election Day, the figures that have been counted and are available from the Western states of Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington may be no more than 60 percent of the votes cast in these states and thus comparisons with previous years tend to yield—until the votes are fully counted sometimes as many as three weeks later—invalid comparisons. Because of this, these four states have been left off all charts in this report. Another problem is, of course, that the 2008 vote counts in this report are frozen in time but not in reality. A state on the bottom of a chart indicating that state had the largest or one of the largest declines in voting when compared to 2004 may still have sufficient votes yet to be counted that will move it up the charts. By and large, however, the further down on a chart of comparison a state is the less the likelihood that it can change from a decrease in turnout to an increase. Similarly, rankings can change as more votes are counted.

> TX_00001760 JA_004519

Two other items are worth mentioning. In most presidential elections, the voters tend to cast their votes for the top of the ticket, the presidential candidates. But often, in one state or another, heated competition or dissatisfaction with the standard bearer can lead citizens to cast more votes for major downticket offices. CSAE has provided a chart of total ballots cast in each state which can be compared to the presidential vote. In 2008, only one race—Senator Lindsey Graham's successful reelection bid in South Carolina—drew more votes (13,000) than the presidential contest.

CSAE's final vote estimate is more tentative this year than most years. Usually through experience CSAE was able to have a good idea of the number of ballots still to be counted when this preliminary report was issued and make a reliable prediction of ultimate turnout. This year, its prediction is considerably more tentative since many more states adopted early voting and easy absentee voting. There are some states, such as Nevada, which have completed processing their absentee votes before this report is issued. Some have processed early votes but not absentees. Until there's some experience one can't be certain that one has a handle on how many votes are still to be counted after Wednesday. Thus, CSAE, this year, chose to predict within a range rather than aim for a number. There were 121,500,000 votes counted as of this writing. CSAE feels reasonably confident that there are no less than five million and no more than seven million votes still to be counted. CSAE reserves the right to have egg on its face.

4. Acknowledgments: Primary research for this report was done by Matthew Mulling, CSAE research associate, who, along with former research associate Mark P. Harvey, is responsible for creating the denominator database for the analysis of November turnout. Organizing the analysis for this report was made profoundly easier by a custom database program developed by Samuel Schreiber, CSAE research associate emeritus. CSAE would also like to express its profound gratitude to Dr. Walter Dean Burnham, professor emeritus at the University of Texas at Austin, for sharing his database, helping to devise CSAE's new November denominator for the analysis of registration and turnout, and for his continuing help to CSAE's work. The committee is also grateful to all the state election officials for graciously yielding their registration and voting figures after an unconscionable amount of hounding by CSAE's staff.

Most of all for this particular report CSAE would like to thank Brian Scanlon, Tracy Lewis, Donna Cassata and Alexandra Gassner for their help in arranging access to the figures AP diligently supplies every election year.

5. Culpability: The analysis contained in this report has been done by Curtis Gans, CSAE's director, who is solely responsible for any and all errors contained within.

TX_00001761 JA_004520

Case 1512-cv-00128-RMC-DStructure 21112/1114 06720712 Page 32f of 125 Republican Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 Ranked By Percent Point Difference President - General Races

		0000	2008	2004		2004
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Turnout	% VAP Voted	% VAP Voted	Point Diff /	% Diff
AR	2,065,000	632,140	30.61	28.43	2.18 /	7.67 5.90
AL	3,394,000	1,263,741	37.23	35.19	2.04 /	5.80
TN SC	4,512,000	1,487,564	32.97	31.62 30.24	1.35 /	4.27
NC NC	3,224,000	1,008,727	31.29		1.05 /	3.47
	6,423,000	2,108,381	32.83	31.83	1.00 /	3.14
LA	3,338,000	1,147,603	34.38	33.62	0.76 /	2.26 1.53
MA	4,625,000	1,104,086	23.87	23.51	0.36 /	
GA	6,302,000	2,022,409	32.09	31.76 31.93	0.33 /	1.04
MS	2,151,000	684,475	31.82		-0.11 /	-0.34
OK	2,561,000	959,645	37.47	37.97	-0.50 /	-1.32
MO	4,328,000	1,442,613	33.33	34.44	-1.11 /	-3.22
KY	3,147,000	1,050,599	33.38	34.67	-1.29 /	-3.72
DC	371,000	14,821	3.99	5.48	-1.49 /	-27.19
TX	14,886,000	4,467,748	30.01	31.90	-1.89 /	-5.92
W/	1,428,000	394,278	27.61	29.93	-2.32 /	-7.75 7.40
FL	12,923,000	3,908,736	30.25	32.70	-2.45 /	-7.49
PA	9,450,000	2,584,119	27.35	29.98	-2.63 /	-8.77
RI	790,000	152,197	19.27	21.93	-2.66 /	-12.13
VA	5,560,000	1,637,337	29.45	32.16	-2.71 /	-8.43
NJ	5,904,000	1,540,907	26.10	28.86	-2.76 /	-9.56
NV	1,642,000	411,988	25.09	27.91	-2.82 /	-10.10
KS	1,968,000	685,414	34.83	37.98	-3.15 /	-8.29
ID	1,024,000	400,989	39.16	42.32	-3.16 /	-7.47
WY	388,000	160,639	41.40	44.58	-3.18 /	-7.13
MN	3,824,000	1,275,653	33.36	36.55	-3.19 /	-8.73
NY	12,653,000	2,573,386	20.34	23.58	-3.24 /	-13.74
IN	4,586,000	1,341,101	29.24	32.81	-3.57 /	-10.88
IA	2,201,000	677,508	30.78	34.57	-3.79 /	-10.96
CT	2,518,000	606,268	24.08	28.14	-4.06 /	-14.43
NM	1,346,000	334,298	24.84	29.08	-4.24 /	-14.58
MI	7,490,000	2,044,405	27.30	31.60	-4.30 /	-13.61
DE	630,000	151,667	24.07	28.47	-4.40 /	-15.45
AZ 	4,117,000	1,012,878	24.60	29.06	-4.46 /	-15.35
IL	8,540,000	1,975,801	23.14	27.72	-4.58 /	-16.52
MD	4,064,000	873,320	21.49	26.23	-4.74 /	-18.07
OH	8,562,000	2,469,544	28.84	33.81	-4.97 /	-14.70
NH	1,016,000	295,193	29.05	34.22	-5.17 /	-15.11
CO	3,219,000	966,957	30.04	35.32	-5.28 /	-14.95
MT	731,000	236,513	32.35	37.85	-5.50 /	-14.53
SD	573,000	203,002	35.43	41.39	-5.96 /	-14.40
VT	495,000	95,422	19.28	25.40	-6.12 /	-24.09
ND	485,000	168,523	34.75	40.88	-6.13 /	-15.00
NE	1,243,000	439,421	35.35	41.59	-6.24 /	-15.00
WI	4,183,000	1,258,181	30.08	36.40	-6.32 /	-17.36
ME	1,048,000	271,876	25.94	32.69	-6.75 /	-20.65
UT	1,578,000	555,497	35.20	43.93	-8.73 /	-19.87
HI	918,000	110,848	12.07	21.94	- 9.87 /	-44.99

TX_00001762 JA_004521

Total Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 President - General Races

	ident - Genera		2008	2	004	2	000 ——	 19	996 ——	19	992	19	988 ——
		2008	% VAP		+/-08-04	% VAP	+/-08-00	% VAP	+/-08-96	% VAP			+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	2,091,143	61.61	56.34	5.27	50.74	10.87	48.34	13.27	55.73	5.88	47.26	14.35
ΑZ	4,117,000	1,886,811	45.83	52.96	-7.13	44.57	1.26	45.10	0.73	54.49	-8.66	48.42	-2.59
AR	2,065,000	1,075,428	52.08	52.35	-0.27	47.05	5.03	47.14	4.94	53.74	-1.66	48.75	3.33
CO	3,219,000	2,110,209	65.55	68.30	-2.75	57.91	7.64	54.13	11.42	62.64	2.91	57.69	7.86
CT	2,518,000	1,567,752	62.26	64.02	-1.76	60.61	1.65	57.83	4.43	66.90	-4.64	60.44	1.82
DE	630,000	403,631	64.07	62.22	1.85	57.36	6.71	49.83	14.24	56.81	7.26	51.95	12.12
DC	371,000	226,573	61.07	58.66	2.41	49.48	11.59	43.70	17.37	51.49	9.58	42.39	18.68
FL	12,923,000	8,072,686	62.47	62.77	-0.30	53.22	9.25	50.57	11.90	55.09	7.38	48.71	13.76
GΑ	6,302,000	3,862,027	61.28	54.72	6.56	45.41	15.87	43.01	18.27	47.58	13.70	40.24	21.04
HI	918,000	415,995	45.32	48.48	-3.16	43.44	1.88	44.08	1.24	47.74	-2.42	47.96	- 2.64
ID	1,024,000	651,714	63.64	61.88	1.76	55.74	7.90	59.67	3.97	66.14	-2.50	60.68	2.96
IL.	8,540,000	5,339,577	62.52	62.31	0.21	56.50	6.02	52.14	10.38	62.32	0.20	57.06	5.46
IN	4,586,000	2,737,551	59.69	54.74	4.95	49.75	9.94	49.76	9.93	55.89	3.80	54.09	5.60
ŀΑ	2,201,000	1,515,815	68.87	69.28	-0.41	61.27	7.60	58.51	10.36	65.73	3.14	59.96	8.91
KS	1,968,000	1,206,127	61.29	61.26	0.03	56.25	5.04	57.60	3.69	63.87	-2.58	56.14	5.15
KY	3,147,000	1,828,097	58.09	58.21	-0.12	51.25	6.84	47.74	10.35	53.76	4.33	49.22	8.87
LA	3,338,000	1,958,059	58.66	59.28	-0.62	55.06	3.60	57.23	1.43	59.61	-0.95	55.59	3.07
ME	1,048,000	674,670	64.38	73.34	-8.96	67.55	-3.17	64.32	0.06	74.10	-9.72	62.86	1.52
MD	4,064,000	2,312,316	56.90	61.04	-4.14	54.36	2.54	49.18	7.72	56.55	0.35	50.89	6.01
MA	4,625,000	3,047,312	65.89	63.77	2.12	60.35	5.54	57.51	8.38	62.87	3.02	60.72	5.17
MI	7,490,000	4,993,499	66.67	66.08	0.59	59.35	7.32	55.20	11.47	63.02	3.65	55.29	11.38
MN	3,824,000	2,901,017	75.86	76.75	-0.89	69.18	6.68	64.68	11.18	72.65	3.21	67.53	8.33
MS	2,151,000	1,212,506	56.37	54.10	2.27	48.36	8.01	45.28	11.09	52.59	3.78	51.90	4.47
МО	4,328,000	2,916,663	67.39	64.62	2.77	57.42	9.97	54.10	13.29	62.30	5.09	56.22	11.17
MT	731,000	472,014	64.57	64.07	0.50	61.25	3.32	64.14	0.43	69.36	- 4.79	64.38	0.19
NE	1,243,000	767,057	61.71	63.11	-1.40	57.09	4.62	56.78	4.93	63.95	-2.24	58.38	3.33
NV	1,642,000	965,120	58.78	55.31	3.47	45.48	13.30	39.75	19.03	53.02	5.76	43.70	15.08
NH	1,016,000	662,456	65.20	70.01	-4.81	62.54	2.66	57.18	8.02	64.58	0.62	57.61	7.59
NJ	5,904,000	3,653,773	61.89	62.41	-0.52	56.32	5.57	54.93	6.96	60.43	1.46	57.06	4.83
NM	1,346,000	798,986	59.36	58.35	1.01	48.35	11.01	47.73	11.63	53.17	6.19	52.23	7.13
NY	12,653,000	7,011,244	55.41	58.83	-3.42	54.69	0.72	50.74	4.67	55.84	-0.43	52.66	2.75
NC	6,423,000	4,256,702	66.27	56.83	9.44	49.66	16.61	45.40	20.87	50.73	15.54	44.26	22.01
ND	485,000	315,987	65.15	65.04	0.11	60.56	4.59	56.68	8.47	66.55	-1.40	64.76	0.39
ОН	8,562,000	5,227,180	61.05	66.54	-5.49	56.40	4.65	55.29	5.76	61.51	-0.46	55.69	5.36
ОK	2,561,000	1,461,931	57.08	57.90	-0.82	49.55	7.53	49.86	7.22	59.88	-2.80	52.00	5.08
PA	9,450,000	5,830,312	61.70	61.88	-0.18	53.60	8.10	49.60	12.10	55.15	6.55	51.00	10.70
RI	790,000	434,411	54.99	56.70	-1.71	54.58	0.41	52.60	2.39	61.61	-6.62	56.04	-1.05
SC	3,224,000	1,876,073	58.19	52.15	6.04	46.71	11.48	40.99	17.20	45.74	12.45	39.85	18.34
SD	573,000	381,876	66.65	69.08	-2.43	57.82	8.83	61.21	5.44	66.58	0.07	63.62	3.03
TN	4,512,000	2,614,005	57.93	55.67	2.26	49.15	8.78	47.14	10.79	52.77	5.16	45.86	12.07
TX	14,886,000	8,045,310	54.05	52.23	1.82	47.80	6.25	44.36	9.69	52.44	1.61	49.47	4.58
UT	1,578,000	883,658	56.00	61.41	-5.41	53.71	2.29	50.85	5.15	65.03	-9.03	62.45	-6.45
VT	495,000	302,337	61.08	65.47	-4.39	64.54	-3.46	58.74	2.34	68.81	-9.03 -7.73	60.38	0.70
	5,560,000	3,460,712		59.91	2.33	53.86	-3.46 8.38	49.52	12.72	55.16		49.91	12.33
VA WV			62.24	53.40		46.29	3.27		3.47	50.42	7.08	49.91	12.33
	1,428,000	707,702	49.56		-3.84 2.03			46.09 57.09			-0.86		
WI	4,183,000	2,965,159	70.89	73.82	-2.93 1.25	66.31	4.58	57.98	12.91	69.75	1.14	62.46	8.43
WY	388,000	246,329	63.49	64.74	-1.25	60.32	3.17	61.32	2.17	61.72	1.77	55.87	7.62
Over													
	178,424,000	108,347,512	60.72	60.54	0.19	53.90	6.82	51.05	9.68	57.88	2.84	52.88	7.85

TX_00001763 JA_004522

Total Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 1984 - 1968 President - General Races

Presid	dent - General I	Races										4.0	000
			2008		984——		980 ——		976 +/-08-76		972 —— +/-08-72		968 +/-08-68
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Turnout	% VAP Voted	% VAP Voted	+/-08-84 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-80 Points	% VAP	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	2,091,143	61.61	50.89	10.72	49.12	12.49	46.35	15.26	43.44	18.17	52.87	8.74
AZ	4,117,000	1,886,811	45.83	46.91	-1.08	45.95	-0.12	45.99	-0.16	49.17	-3.34	50.10	-4.27
AR	2,065,000	1,000,011	52.08	53.28	-1.20	51.89	0.19	51.34	0.74	48.75	3.33	54.15	-2.07
	3,219,000	2,110,209	65.55	56.25	9.30	57.55	8.00	59.13	6.42	62.18	3.37	65.05	0.50
CO CT	2,518,000	1,567,752	62.26	63.81	-1.55	63.63	-1.37	65.35	-3.09	69.35	-7.09	69.67	-7.41
DE	630,000	403,631	64.07	55.71	8.36	55.38	8.69	59.25	4.82	64.88	-0.81	69.15	-5.08
DC	371,000	226,573	61.07	45.54	15.53	37.13	23.94	34.60	26.47	32.36	28.71	36.06	25.01
	12,923,000	8,072,686	62.47	51.91	10.56	51.91	10.56	51.15	11.32	51.49	10.98	53.34	9.13
FL		3,862,027	61.28	42.32	18.96	41.67	19.61	41.86	19.42	37.69	23.59	44.09	17.19
GA	6,302,000	415,995	45.32	48.53	-3.21	47.69	-2.37	50.93	-5.61	54.82	-9.50	57.20	-11.88
HI	918,000			62.77	0.87	69.32	-5.68	60.58	3.06	64.00	-0.36	72.43	- 8.79
ID 	1,024,000	651,714	63.64	60.79	1.73	60.50	2.02	61.98	0.54	64.76	-2.24	69.59	-7.07
IL.	8,540,000	5,339,577	62.52		2.97	58.23	1.46	60.47	-0.78	61.79	-2.10	70.46	-10.77
₹N	4,586,000	2,737,551	59.69	56.72		63.66	5.21	64.09	4.78	64.83	4.04	69.07	-0.20
IA	2,201,000	1,515,815	68.87	64.22	4.65		3.69	58.80	2.49	59.64	1.65	64.13	-2.84
KS	1,968,000	1,206,127	61.29	58.77	2.52	57.60	7.79	48.37	9.72	48.52	9.57	51.21	6.88
KY	3,147,000	1,828,097	58.09	51.95	6.14	50.30	4.27	48.32	10.34	44.35	14.31	54.95	3.71
LA	3,338,000	1,958,059	58.66	59.02	-0.36	54.39		65.30	-0.92	62.34	2.04	66.60	-2.22
ME	1,048,000	674,670	64.38	65.46	-1.08	65.62	-1.24		5.79	52.07	4.83	54.99	1.91
MD	4,064,000	2,312,316	56.90	52.34	4.56	51.37	5.53	51.11		65.15		67.90	
MA	4,625,000	3,047,312	65.89	60.53	5.36	61.63	4.26	64.46	1.43				0.83
MI	7,490,000	4,993,499	66.67	58.23	8.44	61.10	5.57	59.90		61.17			2.83
MN	3,824,000	2,901,017	75.86	69.32	6.54		4.78	71.72		69.50		73.03	
MS	2,151,000	1,212,506	56.37	53.69	2.68		3.96	48.39		44.86		53.26	
MO	4,328,000	2,916,663	67.39	58.29	9.10		8.09			58.05			
MT	731,000	472,014	64.57	68.52	-3.95		-1.36			68.30		68.43	
NE	1,243,000	767,057	61.71	57.96			4.23			57.57			
NV	1,642,000	965,120	58.78	40.89			15.89			49.66			
NH	1,016,000	662,456	65.20	53.42			7.02						
NJ	5,904,000	3,653,773	61.89	60.74	1.15		3.92			63.45			
NM	1,346,000	798,986	59.36	54.60	4.76		7.13			58.70			
NY	12,653,000	7,011,244	55.41	55.88	-0.47	51.60	3.81			60.31			
NC	6,423,000	4,256,702	66.27	47.71	18.56	43.78	22.49	42.97					
ND	485,000	315,987	65.15	67.46	-2.31	65.84	-0.69	68.16		69.26			
ОН	8,562,000	5,227,180	61.05	58.68	2.37	56.08				58.44	2.61	63.40	
OK	2,561,000	1,461,931	57.08	56.87	0.21	53.43	3.65	54.48		56.96			
PA	9,450,000	5,830,312	61.70	55.14	6.56	52.72	8.98						
RI	790,000	434,411	54.99	58.47	-3.48	61.46	-6.47	62.30					
SC	3,224,000	1,876,073		41.32	16.87	40.90	17.29						
SD	573,000	381,876		65.14		67.85	-1.20	64.94	1.71	70.35			
TN	4,512,000	2,614,005		49.71		49.09	8.84	48.39					
TX	14,886,000	8,045,310		52.11		47.27	6.78	46.76	7.29	45.76	8.29		
UT	1,578,000	883,658					-10.25	66.57	-10.57	69.85	-13.85		
VT	495,000	302,337		60.92					4.86	62.73	-1.65	63.54	
VA	5,560,000	3,460,712								45.56	16.68	50.44	11.80
wv	1,428,000	707,702									-13.55	70.42	-20.86
WI	4,183,000	2,965,159								63.52	7.37	66.52	4.37
WY	388,000	246,329								62.21	1.28	65.57	-2.08
Over													
Over	178,424,000	108,347,512	2 60.72	55.65	5.07	7 54.47	6.25	54.89	5.84	56.14	4.59	60.78	-0.06

TX_00001764 JA_004523

Total Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 **President** - General Races

	2011.		2008	20	004	20	000	19	996 ——	19	92	19	988
		2008	% VAP		+/-08-04		+/-08-00		+/-08-96		+/-08-92		+/-08-88
8 T	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	2,091,143	61.61	56.34	5.27	50.74	10.87	48.34	13.27	55.73	5.88	47.26	14.35
AK	476,000	221,678	46.57	69.01	-22.44	67.19	-20.62	59.66	-13.09	68.03	-21.46	57.18	-10.61
AZ	4,117,000	1,886,811	45.83	52.96	-7.13	44.57	1.26	45.10	0.73	54.49	-8.66	48.42	-2.59
AR	2,065,000	1,075,428	52.08	52.35	-0.27	47.05	5.03	47.14	4.94	53.74	-1.66	48.75	3.33
CA	22,319,000	10,104,792	45.27	58.29	-13.02	54.41	-9.14	51.49	-6.22	59.59	-14.32	55.58	-10.31
CO	3,219,000	2,110,209	65.55	68.30	-2.75	57.91	7.64	54.13	11.42	62.64	2.91	57.69	7.86
CT	2,518,000	1,567,752	62.26	64.02	-1.76	60.61	1.65	57.83	4.43	66.90	-4.64	60.44	1.82
DE	630,000	403,631	64.07	62.22	1.85	57.36	6.71	49.83	14.24	56.81	7.26	51.95	12.12
DC	371,000	226,573	61.07	58.66	2.41	49.48	11.59	43.70	17.37	51.49	9.58	42.39	18.68
FL	12,923,000	8,056,877	62.35	62.77	-0.42	53.22	9.13	50.57	11.78	55.09	7.26	48.71	13.64
GA	6,302,000	3,862,027	61.28	54.72	6.56	45.41	15.87	43.01	18.27	47.58	13.70	40.24	21.04
HI	918,000	415,995	45.32	48.48	-3.16	43.44	1.88	44.08	1.24	47.74	-2.42	47.96	-2.64
ID	1,024,000	653,313	63.80	61.88	1.92	55.74	8.06	59.67	4.13	66.14	-2.34	60.68	3.12
IL	8,540,000	5,339,577	62.52	62.31	0.21	56.50	6.02	52.14	10.38	62.32	0.20	57.06	5.46
IN	4,586,000	2,737,551	59.69	54.74	4.95	49.75	9.94	49.76	9.93	55.89	3.80	54.09	5.60
IA	2,201,000	1,515,815	68.87	69.28	-0.41	61.27	7.60	58.51	10.36	65.73	3.14	59.96	8.91
KS	1,968,000	1,206,127	61.29	61.26	0.03	56.25	5.04	57.60	3.69	63.87	- 2.58	56.14	5.15
KY	3,147,000	1,828,097	58.09	58.21	-0.12	51.25	6.84	47.74	10.35	53.76	4.33	49.22	8.87
LA	3,338,000	1,958,059	58.66	59.28	-0.62	55.06	3.60	57.23	1.43	59.61	-0.95	55.59	3.07
ME	1,048,000	674,670	64.38	73.34	-8.96	67.55	-3.17	64.32	0.06	74.10	-9.72	62.86	1.52
MD	4,064,000	2,312,316	56.90	61.04	-4.14	54.36	2.54	49.18	7.72	56.55	0.35	50.89	6.01
MA	4,625,000	3,043,312	65.80	63.77	2.03	60.35	5.45	57.51	8.29	62.87	2.93	60.72	5.08
MI	7,490,000	4,993,499	66.67	66.08	0.59	59.35	7.32	55.20	11.47	63.02	3.65	55.29	11.38
MN	3,824,000	2,901,017	75.86	76.75	-0.89	69.18	6.68	64.68	11.18	72.65	3.21	67.53	8.33
MS	2,151,000	1,212,506	56.37	54.10	2.27	48.36	8.01	45.28	11.09	52.59	3.78	51.90	4.47
MO	4,328,000	2,916,663	67.39	64.62	2.77	57.42	9.97	54.10	13.29	62.30	5.09	56.22	11.17
MT	731,000	472,014	64.57	64.07	0.50	61.25	3.32	64.14	0.43	69.36	-4.79	64.38	0.19
NE	1,243,000	767,057	61.71	63.11	-1.40	57.09	4.62	56.78	4.93	63.95	-2.24	58.38	3.33
NV	1,642,000	965,120		55.31	3.47	45.48	13.30	39.75	19.03	53.02	5.76		15.08
NH	1,016,000	652,470		70.01	-5.79	62.54	1.68	57.18	7.04	64.58	-0.36		6.61
NJ	5,904,000	3,653,773		62.41	-0.52		5.57	54.93	6.96	60.43	1.46		4.83
NM	1,346,000	795,414		58.35	0.74	48.35	10.74	47.73	11.36	53.17	5.92		6.86
NY	12,653,000	7,011,244		58.83	-3.42		0.72		4.67	55.84	-0.43		2.75
NC	6,423,000	4,243,959		56.83	9.24		16.41	45.40	20.67	50.73	15.34		21.81
ND	485,000	315,987		65.04	0.11	60.56	4.59		8.47		-1.40		0.39
ОН	8,562,000	5,212,344		66.54	-5.66		4.48		5.59	61.51	-0.63		5.19
OK	2,561,000	1,461,931		57.90	-0.82		7.53		7.22	59.88	-2.80		5.08
OR	2,615,000	1,253,793		72.66	-24.71	63.18	-15.23		-12.03	68.73 55.45	-20.78		-11.63 10.70
PA	9,450,000	5,830,312		61.88	-0.18		8.10		12.10	55.15 61.61	6.55 -6.62		-1.05
RI	790,000	434,411		56.70	-1.71	54.58	0.41	52.60		61.61	-6.62 12.45		18.34
SC	3,224,000	1,876,073		52.15	6.04		11.48		17.20 5.43	45.74 66.58	0.06		3.02
SD	573,000	381,872		69.08	-2.44		8.82			52.77	5.16		12.07
TN	4,512,000	2,614,005		55.67	2.26		8.78 6.25			52.77 52.44	1.61		
TX	14,886,000	8,045,310		52.23	1.82		6.25			65.03	-9.03		-6.45
UT	1,578,000	883,658		61.41	-5.41		2.29			68.81	-9.03 -7.73		0.70
VT	495,000	302,337		65.47	-4.39		-3.46 8.38						12.33
VA	5,560,000	3,460,712		59.91	2.33		8.38		-20.60		-26.20		-18.10
WA	4,489,000	1,679,170		66.29	-28.88		-23.05 3.27						
WV	1,428,000	707,702		53.40	-3.84		3.27 3.53						
WI	4,183,000	2,921,490		73.82	-3.98 -1.25		3.53 3.17						
WY	388,000	246,329	63.49	64.74	-1.25	00.32	3.17	01.32	2.17	01.72	1.17	00.01	
Over	rall: 208,323,000	121,503,925	58.32	60.59	-2.27	54.24	4.09	51.37	6.96	58.32	0.00	53.30	5.03

TX_00001765 JA_004524 Ranked Order - 2008

Total President - General Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen

	20081/40	2008 Turnout	2008 % VAP Voted
	2008 VAP	Turnout	
1) MN	3,824,000	2,901,017	75.86%
2) WI	4,183,000	2,965,159	70.89%
3) IA	2,201,000	1,515,815	68.87%
4) MO	4,328,000	2,916,663	67.39%
5) MI	7,490,000	4,993,499	66.67%
6) SD	573,000	381,876	66.65%
7) NC	6,423,000	4,256,702	66.27%
8) MA	4,625,000	3,047,312	65.89%
9) CO	3,219,000	2,110,209	65.55%
10) NH	1,016,000	662,456	65.20%
11) ND	485,000	315,987	65.15%
12) MT	731,000	472,014	64.57%
13) ME	1,048,000	674,670	64.38%
14) DE	630,000	403,631	64.07%
15) ID	1,024,000	651,714	63.64%
16) WY	388,000	246,329	63.49%
17) IL	8,540,000	5,339,577	62.52%
18) FL	12,923,000	8,072,686	62.47%
19) CT	2,518,000	1,567,752	62.26%
20) VA	5,560,000	3,460,712	62.24%
21) NJ	5,904,000	3,653,773	61.89%
22) NE	1,243,000	767,057	61.71%
23) PA	9,450,000	5,830,312	61.70%
24) AL	3,394,000	2,091,143	61.61%
25) KS	1,968,000	1,206,127	61.29%
26) GA	6,302,000	3,862,027	61.28%
27) VT	495,000	302,337	61.08%
28) DC	371,000	226,573	61.07%
29) OH	8,562,000	5,227,180	61.05%
30) IN	4,586,000	2,737,551	59.69% 50.36%
31) NM	1,346,000	798,986	59.36% 58.78%
32) NV	1,642,000	965,120	58.66%
33) LA	3,338,000	1,958,059	58.19%
34) SC	3,224,000	1,876,073 1,828,097	58.09%
35) KY	3,147,000	2,614,005	
36) TN	4,512,000 2,561,000	1,461,931	57.93% 57.08%
37) OK 38) MD	4,064,000	2,312,316	56.90%
39) MS	2,151,000	1,212,506	56.37%
40) UT	1,578,000	883,658	56.00%
40) O T	12,653,000	7,011,244	55.41%
		434,411	54.99%
42) RI 43) TX	790,000 14,886,000	8,045,310	54.05%
43) IX 44) AR	2,065,000	1,075,428	52.08%
44) AR 45) WV	1,428,000	707.702	49.56%
46) AZ	4,117,000	1,886,811	45.83%
40) AZ 47) HI	918,000	415,995	45.32%
41) III	910,000	+ 13,333	7 0.3∠ /0

TX_00001766 JA_004525

Case 1:12-cv-00/128-RM C-DSH-MRLW 663-7 unfilled 106720712 Page 39 f 50 125 Total Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Burnham 2008 vs 2004 Ranked By Percent Point Difference President - General Races

		0000	2008	2004		2004
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Turnout	% VAP Voted	% VAP Voted	Point Diff /	% Diff
NC	6,423,000	4,256,702	66.27	57.21	9.06 /	15.84
GA	6,302,000	3,862,027	61.28	55.10	6.18 /	11.22
SC	3,224,000	1,876,073	58.19	52.49	5.70 /	10.86
AL	3,394,000	2,091,143	61.61	56.47	5.14 /	9.10
IN	4,586,000	2,737,551	59.69	54.88	4.81 /	8.76
DC	371,000	226,573	61.07	58.21	2.86 /	4.91
NV	1,642,000	965,120	58.78	56.09	2.69 /	4.80
MO	4,328,000	2,916,663	67.39	64.88	2.51 /	3.87
MS	2,151,000	1,212,506	56.37	54.28	2.09 /	3.85
TN	4,512,000	2,614,005	57.93	55.94	1.99 /	3.56
MA	4,625,000	3,047,312	65.89	63.90	1.99 /	3.11
VA	5,560,000	3,460,712	62.24	60.30	1.94 /	3.22
TX	14,886,000	8,045,310	54.05	52.61	1.44 /	2.74
DE	630,000	403,631	64.07	62.74	1.33 /	2.12
ID	1,024,000	651,714	63.64	62.53	1.11 /	1.78
NM	1,346,000	798,986	59.36	58.71	0.65 /	1.11
MI	7,490,000	4,993,499	66.67	66.33	0.34 /	0.51
IL	8,540,000	5,339,577	62.52	62.35	0.17 /	0.27
ND	485,000	315,987	65.15	65.04	0.11 /	0.17
MT	731,000	472,014	64.57	64.53	0.04 /	0.06
KS	1,968,000	1,206,127	61.29	61.38	-0.09 /	-0.15
KY	3,147,000	1,828,097	58.09	58.40	-0.31 /	-0.53
PA	9,450,000	5,830,312	61.70	62.02	-0.32 /	-0.52
AR	2,065,000	1,075,428	52.08	52.54	-0.46 /	-0.88
IA	2,201,000	1,515,815	68.87	69.41	-0.54 /	-0.78
NJ	5,904,000	3,653,773	61.89	62.58	-0.69 /	-1.10
LA	3,338,000	1,958,059	58.66	59.48	-0.82 /	-1.38
OK	2,561,000	1,461,931	57.08	58.02	-0.94 /	-1.62
FL	12,923,000	8,072,686	62.47	63.44	-0.97 /	-1.53
MN	3,824,000	2,901,017	75.86	77.21	-1.35 /	-1.75
NE	1,243,000	767,057	61.71	63.22	-1.51 /	-2.39
WY	388,000	246,329	63.49	65.09	-1.60 /	-2.46
RI	790,000	434,411	54.99	56.92	-1.93 /	-3.39
CT	2,518,000	1,567,752	62.26	64.23	-1.97 /	-3.07
ŞD	573,000	381,876	66.65	69.32	-2.67 /	-3.85
CO	3,219,000	2,110,209	65.55	68.61	-3.06 /	-4.46
WI	4,183,000	2,965,159	70.89	74.19	-3.30 /	-4.45
NY	12,653,000	7,011,244	55.41	58.86	-3.45 /	-5.86
HI	918,000	415,995	45.32	48.81	-3.49 /	- 7.15
WV	1,428,000	707,702	49.56	53.48	-3.92 /	-7.33
MD	4,064,000	2,312,316	56.90	61.45	-4 .55 /	- 7.40
VT	495,000	302,337	61.08	65.89	-4 .81 /	-7.30
NH	1,016,000	662,456	65.20	70.59	- 5.39 /	-7.64
OH	8,562,000	5,227,180	61.05	66.67	-5.62 /	- 8.43
UT	1,578,000	883,658	56.00	61.82	-5.82 /	-9.41
ΑZ	4,117,000	1,886,811	45.83	53.67	-7.84 /	-14.61
ME	1,048,000	674,670	64.38	73.85	-9.47 /	-12.82

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Democratic Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 President - General Races

Presid	dent - General F	Races								4.0		10	000
			2008		004——		000 ——		996 ——		92		88 ——
		2008	% VAP		+/-08-04		+/-08-00		+/-08-96	% VAP	+/-08-92 Points	% VAP	+/-08-88 Points
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points				
AL	3,394,000	811,510	23.91	20.76	3.15	21.09	2.82	20.86	3.05	22.78	1.13	18.84	5.07
ΑZ	4,117,000	851,589	20.68	23.51	-2.83	19.94	0.74	20.98	-0.30	19.90	0.78	18.76	1.92
AR	2,065,000	417,314	20.21	23.32	-3.11	21.58	-1.37	25.33	-5.12	28.59	-8.38	20.57	-0.36
CO	3,219,000	1,109,328	34.46	32.13	2.33	24.55	9.91	24.05	10.41	25.14	9.32	26.12	8.34
CT	2,518,000	943,819	37.48	34.77	2.71	33.89	3.59	30.55	6.93	28.24	9.24	28.33	9.15
DE	630,000	247,386	39.27	33.19	6.08	31.54	7.73	25.80	13.47	24.72	14.55	22.59	16.68
DC	371,000	210,403	56.71	52.31	4.40	42.14	14.57	37.23	19.48	43.58	13.13	35.03	21.68
FL	12,923,000	4,103,638	31.75	29.56	2.19	25.99	5.76	24.29	7.46	21.49	10.26	18.76	12.99
GA	6,302,000	1,811,198	28.74	22.66	6.08	19.52	9.22	19.72	9.02	20.68	8.06	15.89	12.85
HI	918,000	298,621	32.53	26.18	6.35	24.24	8.29	25.09	7.44	22.96	9.57	26.03	6.50
ID	1,024,000	235,219	22.97	18.73	4.24	15.40	7.57	20.08	2.89	18.79	4.18	21.85	1.12
IL	8,540,000	3,293,340	38.56	34.16	4.40	30.85	7.71	28.32	10.24	30.28	8.28	27.73	10.83
IN	4,586,000	1,367,264	29.81	21.49	8.32	20.40	9.41	20.68	9.13	20.56	9.25	21.47	8.34
IA	2,201,000	818,240	37.18	34.11	3.07	29.74	7.44	29.41	7.77	28.45	8.73	32.81	4.37
KS	1,968,000	499,863	25.40	22.43	2.97	20.95	4.45	20.79	4.61	21.55	3.85	23.89	1.51
KY	3,147,000	751,515	23.88	23.10	0.78	21.20	2.68	21.88	2.00	23.95	-0.07	21.60	2.28
LA	3,338,000	780,981	23.40	25.02	-1.62	24.71	-1.31	29.77	-6.37	27.17	-3.77	24.50	-1.10
ME	1,048,000	390,147	37.23	39.29	-2.06	33.16	4.07	33.20	4.03	28.73	8.50	27.58	9.65
MD	4,064,000	1,409,150		34.17	0.50	30.73	3.94	26.68	7.99	28.16	6.51	24.53	10.14
MA	4,625,000	1,890,183		39.59		36.09	4.78	35.35	5.52	29.89	10.98	32.32	8.55
MI	7,490,000	2,867,680		33.85			7.85	28.54	9.75	27.59	10.70	25.25	13.04
MN	3,824,000	1,573,246		39.21	1.93		8.00	33.05	8.09	31.59	9.55	35.73	5.41
MS	2,151,000	517,899		21.73			4.40	19.96	4.12	21.44	2.64	20.27	3.81
MO	4,328,000	1,436,745		29.79			6.17	25.72	7.48	27.45	5.75	26.90	6.30
MT	731,000	220,401		24.71			9.71	26.44	3.71	26.10	4.05	29.74	0.41
NE	1,243,000	315,913		20.63			6.44	19.85	5.57	18.80	6.62	22.88	2.54
NV	1,642,000	531,884		26.48			11.48	17.46	14.93	19.81	12.58	16.57	15.82
NH	1,016,000	361,638		35.18					7.39	25.09	10.50	20.91	14.68
NJ	5,904,000	2,073,934		33.03			3.52			25.95	9.18	24.31	10.82
NM	1,346,000	454,291		28.62					10.27	24.40	9.35	24.50	9.25
	12,653,000	4,357,360		34.34							6.67	27.19	7.25
NY NC	6,423,000	2,122,977		24.77						21.64	11.41	18.46	14.59
ND	485,000	141,113		23.09							7.68	27.83	1.27
OH	8,562,000	2,673,958		32.41							6.51	24.58	6.65
	2,561,000	502,286		19.94						20.37	-0.76	21.47	-1.86
OK	9,450,000	3,184,807		31.53							8.81	24.68	9.02
PA	790,000	275,028		33.69							5.83	31.18	3.63
RI	3,224,000	842,441										14.98	11.15
SC	•	170,877											0.23
SD	573,000	1,093,213											5.18
TN	4,512,000												
TX	14,886,000	3,521,164											
UT	1,578,000	301,771											
VT	495,000	201,999											
VA	5,560,000	1,792,502											
WV	1,428,000	301,438											
WI	4,183,000	1,670,258											
WY	388,000	80,496	20.75	18.82	1.90	, 10.71		. 22.00	, 1.0				
Ove									- 00	. 04-70		2202	2 7.37
	178,424,000	55,828,027	7 31.29	28.7	1 2.5	8 25.77	7 5.52	2 25.0	5 6.24	24.70	6.59	23.92	. 1.31

TX_00001768 JA_004527

Case²193:13-68128-RM C-DS+121066-BJcuFileAt 211-1214-14-dioJ/28/12 PPQGe 1996F125

Democratic Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 1984 - 1968 President - General Races

			2008	 1	984		980 ——		976 ——		972 ——		968
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Tumout	% VAP Voted	% VAP Voted	+/-08-84 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-80 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-76 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-72 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-68 Points
								25.83	-1.92	11.09	12.82	9.90	14.0
AL.	3,394,000	811,510	23.91	19.48	4.43	23.31 12.98	0.60 7.70	18.30	2.38	15.67	5.01	17.54	3.1
VZ	4,117,000	851,589	20.68	15.27	5.41 -0.19	24.66	-4.45	33.35	-13.14	14.96	5.25	16.44	3.7
AR	2,065,000	417,314	20.21	20.40		17.88	16.58	25.17	9.29	21.51	12.95	26.88	7.5
0	3,219,000	1,109,328	34.46	19.76	14.70		12.97	30.65	6.83	27.83	9.65	34.47	3.0
CT	2,518,000	943,819	37.48	24.78	12.70	24.51	14.45	30.80	8.47	25.42	13.85	28.77	10.5
DE	630,000	247,386	39.27	22.24	17.03	24.82	28.93	28.24	28.47	25.42	31.44	29.51	27.2
DC	371,000	210,403	56.71	38.88	17.83	27.78 19.99	11.76	26.56	5.19	14.31	17.44	16.50	15.2
=L	12,923,000	4,103,638	31.75	17.99	13.76		5.50	27.94	0.80	9.29	19.45	11.79	16.9
GA 	6,302,000	1,811,198	28.74	16.84	11.90	23.24			6.77	20.57	11.96	34.22	-1.6
HI	918,000	298,621	32.53	21.27	11.26	21.36	11.17	25.76			6.30	22.21	0.7
D	1,024,000	235,219	22.97	16.57	6.40	17.46	5.51	22.28	0.69	16.67		30.72	7.8
L	8,540,000	3,293,340	38.56	26.32	12.24	25.24	13.32	29.83	8.73	26.24	12.32		
N	4,586,000	1,367,264	29.81	21.37	8.44	21.93	7.88	27.63	2.18	20.60	9.21	26.76	3.0
Α	2,201,000	818,240	37.18	29.47	7.71	24.57	12.61	31.06	6.12	26.24	10.94	28.19	8.9
KS	1,968,000	499,863	25.40	19.16	6.24	19.17	6.23	26.42	-1.02	17.60	7.80	22.26	3.1
KY	3,147,000	751,515	23.88	20.47	3.41	23.95	-0.07	25.52	-1.64	16.87	7.01	19.28	4.6
LA	3,338,000	780,981	23.40	22.53	0.87	24.88	-1.48	24.99	-1.59	12.57	10.83	15.50	7.9
ME	1,048,000	390,147	37.23	25.39	11.84	27.73	9.50	31.39	5.84	24.00	13.23	36.83	0.4
MD	4,064,000	1,409,150	34.67	24.61	10.06	24.21	10.46	26.97	7.70	19.45	15.22	23.97	10.7
MΑ	4,625,000	1,890,183	40.87	29.32	11.55	25.73	15.14	36.17	4.70	35.31	5.56	42.78	-1.9
MI	7,490,000	2,867,680	38.29	23.43	14.86	25.97	12.32	27.81	10.48	25.58	12.71	31.72	6.5
MN	3,824,000	1,573,246	41.14	34.47	6.67	33.05	8.09	39.37	1.77	32.02	9.12	39.44	1.7
MS	2,151,000	517,899	24.08	20.09	3.99	25.21	-1.13	23.98	0.10	8.80	15.28	12.26	11.8
MO	4,328,000	1,436,745	33.20	23.30	9.90	26.30	6.90	29.45	3.75	21.81	11.39	27.85	5.3
MT	731,000	220,401	30.15	26.16	3.99	21.38	8.77	28.98	1.17	25.85	4.30	28.46	1.6
NE	1,243,000	315,913	25.42	16.70	8.72	14.96	10.46	21.90	3.52	16.98	8.44	19.28	6.1
NV	1,642,000	531,884	32.39	13.07	19.32	11.53	20.86	19.27	13.12	18.04	14.35	22.12	10.2
NH	1,016,000	361,638	35.59	16.53	19.06	16.49	19.10	24.90	10.69	22.74	12.85	30.51	5.0
NJ	5,904,000	2,073,934	35.13	23.81	11.32	22.35	12.78	29.18	5.95	23.33	11.80	29.24	5.8
NM	1,346,000	454,291	33.75	21.42	12.33	19.18	14.57	25.79	7.96	21.44	12.31	23.91	9.8
NY	12,653,000	4,357,360	34.44	25.61	8.83	22.70	11.74	28.37	6.07	24.84	9.60	29.91	4.5
NC	6,423,000	2,122,977	33.05	18.08		20.66	12.39	23.74	9.31	12.53	20.52	15.89	17.1
ND	485,000	141,113	29.10	22.80		17.29	11.81	31.21	-2.11	24.79	4.31	26.70	2.4
OH	8,562,000	2,673,958	31.23	23.48			8.29	27.31	3.92	22.25	8.98	27.23	4.0
OK	2,561,000	502,286	19.61	17.44			0.93	26.56	-6.95		5.94	19.44	0.
PA	9,450,000	3,184,807		25.36				27.78	5.92		11.32		2.
RI	790,000	275,028		28.08				34.49	0.32		4.40		
SC	3,224,000	842,441	26.13	14.70				22.65	3.48		15.42		
SD	573,000	170,877		23.79				31.76	-1.94		-2.20		
	4,512,000	1,093,213		20.67				27.07	-2.84		11.18		9.
TN				18.82				23.91	-0.26		8.43		
TX	14,886,000	3,521,164		15.85				22.40	-3.28		0.68		
UT	1,578,000	301,771	19.12					24.24	-5.20 16.57		17.93		
VT	495,000	201,999		24.86				22.93	9.31				
VA	5,560,000	1,792,502		19.21									
WV	1,428,000	301,438		24.04				33.28	-12.17				
WI	4,183,000	1,670,258		29.06				33.03 21.92	6.90 -1.17				
WY	388,000	80,496	20.75	16.78	3.97	10.40	3.30	21.92	-1.17	10.50	1.19	20.23	
Ove	rall: 178,424,000	55,828,027	31.29	22.48	8.81	22.75	8.54	27.71	3.58	20.74	10.55	25.76	5.
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Case²193:13-68128-RMC-DS+121W66-37cuFileH 211-121 Hild 10 1728/12 PPRG-140 6 P125

Ranked Order - 2008

Democratic President - General Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen

		2008	2008 % VAP
·	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted
1) DC	371,000	210,403	56.71%
2) MN	3,824,000	1,573,246	41.14%
3) MA	4,625,000	1,890,183	40.87%
4) VT	495,000	201,999	40.81%
5) WI	4,183,000	1,670,258	39.93%
6) DE	630,000	247,386	39.27%
7) IL	8,540,000	3,293,340	38.56%
8) MI	7,490,000	2,867,680	38.29%
9) CT	2,518,000	943,819	37.48%
10) ME	1,048,000	390,147	37.23%
11) IA	2,201,000	818,240	37.18%
12) NH	1,016,000	361,638	35.59%
13) NJ	5,904,000	2,073,934	35.13%
14) RI	790,000	275,028	34.81%
15) MD	4,064,000	1,409,150	34.67%
16) CO	3,219,000	1,109,328	34.46%
17) NY	12,653,000	4,357,360	34.44%
18) NM	1,346,000	454,291	33.75%
19) PA	9,450,000	3,184,807	33.70%
20) MO	4,328,000	1,436,745	33.20%
21) NC	6,423,000	2,122,977	33.05%
22) HI	918,000	298,621	32.53%
23) NV	1,642,000	531,884	32.39%
24) VA	5,560,000	1,792,502	32.24%
25) FL	12,923,000	4,103,638	31.75%
26) OH	8,562,000	2,673,958	31.23%
27) MT	731,000	220,401	30.15%
28) SD	573,000	170,877	29.82%
29) IN	4,586,000	1,367,264	29.81%
30) ND	485,000	141,113	29.10%
31) GA	6,302,000	1,811,198	28.74%
32) SC	3,224,000	842,441	26.13%
33) NE	1,243,000	315,913	25.42%
34) KS	1,968,000	499,863	25.40%
35) TN	4,512,000	1,093,213	24.23%
36) MS	2,151,000	517,899	24.08%
37) AL	3,394,000	811,510	23.91%
38) KY	3,147,000	751,515	23.88%
39) TX	14,886,000	3,521,164	23.65%
40) LA	3,338,000	780,981	23.40%
41) ID	1,024,000	235,219	22.97%
42) WV	1,428,000	301,438	21.11%
43) WY	388,000	80,496	20.75%
44) AZ	4,117,000	851,589	20.68%
45) AR	2,065,000	417,314	20.21%
46) OK	2,561,000	502,286	19.61%
47) UT	1,578,000	301,771	19.12%

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Case 193:13-60128-RMC-BS+1RLW66-37cuFileH 211-1214-16d-007/26/12 PAGG-1416-15-125

Republican Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 President - General Races

1 1031	dent - General	110003		=	20.4	-	000	, .	200		200		200
		2222	2008		004——		000 —		996		992 —		988 ——
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Turnout	% VAP Voted	% VAP Voted	+/-08-04 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-00 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-96 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-92 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-88 Points
AL	3,394,000	1,263,741	37.23	35.19	2.04	28.66	8.57	24.23	13.00	26.55	10.68	27.96	9.27
ΑZ	4,117,000	1,012,878	24.60	29.06	-4.46	22.74	1.86	19.98	4.62	20.96	3.64	29.03	-4.43
AR	2,065,000	632,140	30.61	28.43	2.18	24.14	6.47	17.35	13.26	19.07	11.54	27.48	3.13
CO	3,219,000	966,957	30.04	35.32	-5.28	29.39	0.65	24.79	5.25	22.47	7.57	30.61	-0.57
CT	2,518,000	606,268	24.08	28.14	-4 .06	23.30	0.78	20.06	4.02	23.94	0.14	31.42	-7.34
DE	630,000	151,667	24.07	28.47	-4.40	24.04	0.03	18.21	5.86	20.06	4.01	29.03	-4.96
DC	371,000	14,821	3.99	5.48	-1.49	4.43	-0.44	4.08	-0.09	4.68	-0.69	6.06	-2.07
FL	12,923,000	3,908,736	30.25	32.70	-2.45	26.00	4.25	21.40	8.85	22.53	7.72	29.65	0.60
GA	6,302,000	2,022,409	32.09	31.76	0.33	24.83	7.26	20.22	11.87	20.40	11.69	24.05	8.04
HI	918,000	110,848	12.07	21.94	-9.87	16.27	-4.20	13.95	-1.88	17.52	-5.45	21.46	-9.39
iD	1,024,000	400,989	39.16	42.32	-3.16	37.44	1.72	31.14	8.02	27.80	11.36	37.67	1.49
IL	8,540,000	1,975,801	23.14	27.72	-4.58	24.06	-0.92	19.19	3.95	21.40	1.74	28.92	-5.78
IN	4,586,000	1,341,101	29.24	32.81	-3.57	28.18	1.06	23.46	5.78	23.98	5.26	32.37	-3.13
IA	2,201,000	677,508	30.78	34.57	-3.79	29.55	1.23	23.36	7.42	24.50	6.28	26.68	4.10
KS	1,968,000	685,414	34.83	37.98	-3.15	32.65	2.18	31.27	3.56	24.83	10.00	31.32	3.51
KY	3,147,000	1,050,599	33.38	34.67	-1.29	28.96	4.42	21.43	11.95	22.22	11.16	27.33	6.05
LA	3,338,000	1,147,603	34.38	33.62	0.76	28.93	5.45	22.86	11.52	24.42	9.96	30.17	4.21
ME	1,048,000	271,876	25.94	32.69	-6.75	29.70	-3.76	19.79	6.15	22.52	3.42	34.78	-8.84
MD	4,064,000	873,320	21.49	26.23	-4.74	21.86	-0.37	18.82	2.67	20.15	1.34	26.01	-4.52
	4,625,000	1,104,086	23.87	23.51	0.36	19.61	4.26	16.15	7.72	18.25	5.62	27.55	-3.68
MA			27.30	31.60	-4.30	27.39	-0.09	21.25	6.05	22.92	4.38	29.62	-2.32
MI	7,490,000	2,044,405		36.55	-4.30 -3.19	31.48	1.88	22.61	10.75	23.14	10.22	30.99	2.37
MN	3,824,000	1,275,653	33.36 31.82	31.93	-0.11	27.86	3.96	22.28	9.54	26.13	5.69	31.08	0.74
MS	2,151,000	684,475	33.33	34.44	-1.11	28.95	4.38	22.31	11.02	21.13	12.20	29.13	4.20
MO	4,328,000	1,442,613	32.35	37.85	-5.50	35.79	-3.44	28.29	4.06	24.36	7.99	33.52	-1.17
MT	731,000	236,513 439,421	35.35	41.59	-6.24	35.53	-0.18	30.47	4.88	29.79	5.56	35.12	0.23
NE	1,243,000			27.91	-2.82	22.52	2.57	17.06	8.03	18.41	6.68	25.72	-0.63
NV	1,642,000	411,988 295,193	25.09 29.05	34.22	-2.02 -5.17	30.06	-1.01	22.51	6.54	24.31	4.74	35.96	-6.91
NH	1,016,000 5,904,000		26.10	28.86	-2.76	22.69	3.41	19.70	6.40	24.52	1.58	32.09	-5.99
NJ		1,540,907	24.84	29.08	-4.24	23.14	1.70	19.70	4.86	19.85	4.99	27.09	-2.25
NM	1,346,000	334,298 2,573,386	20.34	23.58	-3.24	19.27	1.07	15.53	4.81	18.92	1.42	25.03	-4.69
NY	12,653,000				1.00	27.83	5.00	22.12	10.71	22.04	10.79	25.66	7.17
NC	6,423,000	2,108,381	32.83	31.83	-6.13	36.73	-1.98	26.61	8.14	29.43	5.32	36.29	-1.54
ND	485,000	168,523	34.75	40.88 33.81	-0.13 -4.97	28.19	0.65	22.68	6.16	23.59	5.25	30.63	-1.79
OH	8,562,000	2,469,544	28.84 37.47	37.97	-0.50	29.88	7.59	24.06	13.41	25.54	11.93	30.12	7.35
OK	2,561,000	959,645						19.83	7.52	19.92	7.43	25.86	1.49
PA	9,450,000	2,584,119	27.35 19.27	29.98 21.93	-2.63 -2.66	24.89 17.43	2.46 1.84	14.11	5.16	17.88	1.39	24.62	-5.35
RI SC	790,000	152,197		30.24	1.05	26.55	4.74	20.41	10.88	21.97	9.32	24.52	-5.33 6.78
SC	3,224,000	1,008,727	31.29 35.43	41.39	-5.96	26.55 34.86	0.57	28.46	6.97	27.07	8.36	33.62	1.81
SD	573,000	203,002										26.55	6.42
TN	4,512,000	1,487,564	32.97	31.62	1.35	25.14	7.83	21.49	11.48 8.38	22.39 21.27	10.58 8.74	27.68	2.33
TX	14,886,000	4,467,748	30.01	31.90	-1.89	28.35	1.66	21.63		28.20	7.00	41.36	-6.16
UT	1,578,000	555,497	35.20	43.93	-8.73	35.90	-0.70	27.65	7.55				-11.57
VT	495,000	95,422	19.28	25.40	-6.12	26.27	-6.99	18.26	1.02	20.93	-1.65	30.85	
VA	5,560,000	1,637,337	29.45	32.16	-2.71	28.26	1.19	23.33	6.12	24.80	4.65	29.81	-0.36
WV	1,428,000	394,278	27.61	29.93	-2.32	24.03	3.58	16.94	10.67	17.84	9.77	22.95	4.66
WI	4,183,000	1,258,181	30.08	36.40	-6.32	31.57	-1.49	22.31	7.77	25.65	4.43	29.85	0.23
WY	388,000	160,639	41.40	44.58	-3.18	40.87	0.53	30.55	10.85	24.41	16.99	33.82	7.58
Over													
	178,424,000	51,208,418	28.70	31.27	-2.57	26.25	2.45	20.99	7.71	22.15	6.55	28.48	0.22

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Republican Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 1984 - 1968 President - General Races

			2008		984		980		976 ——		972 ——		968 ——
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Turnout	% VAP Voted	% VAP Voted	+/-08-84 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-80 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-76 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-72 Points	% VAP Voted	+/-08-68 Points
AL	3,394,000	1,263,741	37.23	30.81	6.42	23.95	13.28	19.75	17.48	31.46	5.77	7.40	29.83
ΑZ	4,117,000	1,012,878	24.60	31.16	-6.56	27.85	-3.25	25.92	-1.32	31.79	- 7.19	27.44	-2.84
AR	2,065,000	632,140	30.61	32.22	-1.61	24.98	5.63	17.92	12.69	33.57	-2.96	16.66	13.95
co	3,219,000	966,957	30.04	35.68	-5.64	31.69	-1.65	31.95	-1.91	38.93	-8.89	32.83	-2.79
СТ	2,518,000	606,268	24.08	38.75	-14.67	30.64	-6.56	34.02	-9.94	40.62	-16.54	30.88	-6.80
DE	630,000	151,667	24.07	33.30	- 9.23	26.12	-2.05	27.60	-3.53	38.67	-14.60	31.20	-7.13
DC	371,000	14,821	3.99	6.25	-2.26	4.99	-1.00	5.71	-1.72	6.98	-2.99	6.56	-2.57
FL	12,923,000	3,908,736	30.25	33.90	-3.65	28.82	1.43	23.86	6.39	37.03	-6.78	21.62	8.63
GΑ	6,302,000	2,022,409	32.09	25.46	6.63	17.07	15.02	13.80	18.29	28.28	3.81	13.40	18.69
HI	918,000	110,848	12.07	26.74	-14.67	20.46	-8.39	24.48	-12.41	34.25	-22.18	22.14	-10.07
ID	1,024,000	400,989	39.16	45.42	-6.26	46.07	-6.91	35.94	3.22	41.11	-1.95	41.14	-1.98
IL	8,540,000	1,975,801	23.14	34.15	-11.01	30.04	-6.90	31.06	-7.92	38.23	-15.09	32.76	-9.62
IN	4,586,000	1,341,101	29.24	34.98	-5.74	32.61	-3.37	32.24	-3.00	40.85	-11.61	35.43	-6.19
IA	2,201,000	677,508	30.78	34.21	-3.43	32.66	-1.88	31.71	-0.93	37.35	-6.57	36.61	-5.83
KS	1,968,000	685,414	34.83	38.95	-4.12	33.32	1.51	30.86	3.97	40.35	-5.52	35.17	-0.34
KY	3,147,000	1,050,599	33.38	31.17	2.21	24.68	8.70	22.04	11.34	30.75	2.63	22.43	10.95
LA	3,338,000	1,147,603	34.38	35.87	-1.49	27.85	6.53	22.20	12.18	28.97	5.41	12.90	21.48
ME	1,048,000	271,876	25.94	39.82	-13.88	29.93	-3.99	31.94	-6.00	38.33	-12.39	28.69	-2.75
MD	4,064,000	873,320	21.49	27.48	-5.99	22.69	-1.20	23.88	- 2.39	31.90	-10.41	23.06	-1.57
MA	4,625,000	1,104,086	23.87	31.01	-7.14	25.82	-1.95	26.07	- 2.20	29.47	-5.60	22.33	1.54
MI	7,490,000	2,044,405	27.30	34.49	-7.19	29.93	-2.63	31.04	-3.74	34.39	-7.09	27.29	0.01
MN	3,824,000	1,275,653	33.36	34.34	-0.98	30.25	3.11	30.14	3.22	35.84	-2.48	30.28	3.08
MS	2,151,000	684,475	31.82	33.22	-1.40	25.90	5.92	23.07	8.75	35.08	-3.26	7.20	24.62
МО	4,328,000	1,442,613	33.33	34.99	-1.66	30.34	2.99	27.36	5.97	36.09	-2.76	28.57	4.76
MT	731,000	236,513	32.35	41.43	- 9.08	37.47	-5.12	33.73	-1.38	39.56	-7.21	34.62	-2.27
NE	1,243,000	439,421	35.35	40.89	-5.54	37.66	-2.31	33.71	1.64	40.59	-5.24	36.25	-0.90
NV	1,642,000	411,988	25.09	26.93	-1.84	26.82	-1.73	21.10	3.99	31.63	-6.54	26.71	-1.62
NH	1,016,000	295,193	29.05	36.68	-7.63	33.59	-4.54	31.35	-2.30	41.74	-12.69	36.19	-7.14
NJ	5,904,000	1,540,907	26.10	36.50	-10.40	30.13	-4.03	30.49	-4.39	39.07	-12.97	30.65	-4.55
NM	1,346,000	334,298	24.84	32.60	-7.76	28.66	-3.82	27.11	-2.27	35.81	-10.97	31.19	-6.35
NY	12,653,000	2,573,386	20.34	30.08	-9.74	24.08	-3.74	25.95	-5.61	35.29	-14.95	26.63	-6.29
NC	6,423,000	2,108,381	32.83	29.53	3.30	21.59	11.24	18.99	13.84	30.13	2.70	21.48	11.35
ND	485,000	168,523	34.75	43.74	-8.99	42.29	-7.54	35.20	-0.45	42.99	-8.24	39.06	-4.31
ОН	8,562,000	2,469,544	28.84	34.45	-5.61	28.89	-0.05	27.16	1.68	34.85	-6.01	28.67	0.17
OK	2,561,000	959,645	37.47	39.02	-1.55	32.32	5.15	27.22	10.25	41.98	-4.51	28.98	8.49
PA	9,450,000	2,584,119	27.35	29.41	-2.06	26.14	1.21	26.31	1.04	33.81	-6.46	28.67	-1.32
RI	790,000	152,197	19.27	30.21	-10.94	22.86	-3.59	27.46		34.43	-15.16	21.17	
SC	3,224,000	1,008,727	31.29	26.26	5.03	20.21	11.08	17.39	13.90	27.34	3.95	17.78	
SD	573,000	203,002	35.43	41.04	-5.61	41.06	-5.63	32.72	2.71	38.10		38.82	
TN	4,512,000	1,487,564	32.97	28.75	4.22	23.91	9.06	20.78	12.19	29.70		20.33	
TX	14,886,000	4,467,748	30.01	33.15	-3.14	26.13	3.88	22.43	7.58	30.30		19.32	
UT	1,578,000	555,497	35.20	47.87	-12.67	48.21	-13.01	41.56	-6.36	47.25		43.48	
VT	495,000	95,422	19.28	35.29	-16.01	26.07	-6.79	30.56	-11.28	39.31	-20.03	33.52	
VA	5,560,000	1,637,337	29.45	32.27	-2.82	25.76	3.69	23.57	5.88	30.91	-1.46		
WV	1,428,000	394,278	27.61	29.71	-2.10	24.20	3.41	24.03	3.58	40.15			
WI	4,183,000	1,258,181	30.08	34.97	- 4.89	32.74	-2.66	31.91	-1.83	33.92		31.85	
WY	388,000	160,639	41.40	41.90	-0.50	34.59	6.81	32.65	8.75	42.93			
		,											
Over	178,424,000	51,208,418	28.70	32.84	-4.14	27.55	1.15	26.23	2.47	34.58	-5.88	26.01	2.69

TX_00001772 JA_004531 Ranked Order - 2008

Republican President - General Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen

		2008	2008 % VAP
	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted
1) WY	388,000	160,639	41.40%
2) ID	1,024,000	400,989	39.16%
3) OK	2,561,000	959,645	37.47%
4) AL	3,394,000	1,263,741	37.23%
5) SD	573,000	203,002	35.43%
6) NE	1,243,000	439,421	35.35%
7) UT	1,578,000	555,497	35.20%
8) KS	1,968,000	685,414	34.83%
9) ND	485,000	168,523	34.75%
10) LA	3,338,000	1,147,603	34.38%
11) KY	3,147,000	1,050,599	33.38%
12) MN	3,824,000	1,275,653	33.36%
13) MO	4,328,000	1,442,613	33.33%
14) TN	4,512,000	1,487,564	32.97%
15) NC	6,423,000	2,108,381	32.83%
16) MT	731,000	236,513	32.35%
17) GA	6,302,000	2,022,409	32.09%
18) MS	2,151,000	684,475	31.82%
19) SC	3,224,000	1,008,727	31.29%
20) IA	2,201,000	677,508	30.78%
21) AR	2,065,000	632,140	30.61%
22) FL	12,923,000	3,908,736	30.25%
23) WI	4,183,000	1,258,181	30.08%
24) CO	3,219,000	966,957	30.04%
25) TX	14,886,000	4,467,748	30.01%
26) VA	5,560,000	1,637,337	29.45%
27) IN	4,586,000	1,341,101	29.24%
28) NH	1,016,000	295,193	29.05%
29) OH	8,562,000	2,469,544	28.84%
30) WV	1,428,000	394,278	27.61%
31) PA	9,450,000	2,584,119	27.35%
32) MI	7,490,000	2,044,405	27.30%
33) NJ	5,904,000	1,540,907	26.10%
34) ME	1,048,000	271,876	25.94%
35) NV	1,642,000	411,988	25.09%
36) NM	1,346,000	334,298	24.84%
37) AZ	4,117,000	1,012,878	24.60%
38) CT	2,518,000	606,268	24.08%
39) DE	630,000	151,667	24.07%
40) MA	4,625,000	1,104,086	23.87%
41) IL	8,540,000	1,975,801	23.14%
42) MD	4,064,000	873,320	21.49%
43) NY	12,653,000	2,573,386	20.34%
44) VT	495,000	95,422	19.28%
45) RI	790,000	152,197	19.27%
46) HI	918,000	110,848	12.07%
47) DC	371,000	14,821	3.99%

TX_00001773 JA_004532

Case 192:13-60128-RMC-BS+17RLW66-37cuFileH 211-1214-16-10-1/28/12 PAGG-1446-1925

Total Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 U.S. Senate - General Races

			2008	2	004	2	000	19	996	 19	992 ——	19	988
		2008	% VAP	% VAP	+/-08-04	% VAP	+/-08-00	% VAP	+/-08-96	% VAP	+/-08-92	% VAP	+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	2,052,834	60.48	55.01	5.47	_	_	47.24	13.24	52.09	8.39	_	_
AR	2,065,000	1,005,302	48.68	51.53	-2.85	_	_	45.11	3.57	52.01	-3.33	_	
CO	3,219,000	2,051,705	63.74	67.59	-3.85	_	_	52.66	11.08	61.97	1.77	_	_
DE	630,000	398,068	63.19	_	_	57.27	5.92	50.66	12.53		_	50.62	12.57
GA	6,302,000	3,695,408	58.64	53.43	5.21	42.47	16.17	42.27	16.37	46.16	12.48	_	_
ID	1,024,000	641,784	62.67	52.11	10.56	_	_	60.34	2.33	65.64	-2.97	_	_
IL	8,540,000	4,500,638	52.70	60.75	- 8.05		_	51.41	1.29	60.96	-8.26	_	_
IA	2,201,000	1,486,720	67.55	68.01	-0.46	_	_	58.04	9.51	62.71	4.84	_	_
KS	1,968,000	1,183,030	60.11	58.23	1.88	_	_	57.09	3.02	62.17	-2.06		_
KY	3,147,000	1,798,844	57.16	55.90	1.26	_	_	44.93	12.23	47.92	9.24		_
LA	3,338,000	1,894,072	56.74	56.38	0.36	_	_	54.54	2.20	28.07	28.67		_
ME	1,048,000	667,220	63.67	_	_	65.79	-2.12	64.41	-0.74	_	_	63.12	0.55
MA	4,625,000	2,975,540	64.34	_	_	58.04	6.30	57.49	6.85	_	_	60.11	4.23
MI	7,490,000	4,843,549	64.67	_	_	58.44	6.23	53.97	10.70	_	_	52.83	11.84
MN	3,824,000	2,883,015	75.39		_	68.64	6.75	64.40	10.99	_	_	67.44	7.95
MS	2,151,000	1,168,813	54.34	_	_	48.35	5.99	44.51	9.83	_	_	52.74	1.60
MT	731,000	460,210	62.96		_	61.34	1.62	64.17	-1.21	_	_	64.31	-1.35
NE	1,243,000	761,840	61.29		_	56.70	4.59	56.73	4.56	_	_	58.95	2.34
NH	1,016,000	648,661	63.84	67.98	-4.14	_	_	56.43	7.41	62.24	1.60	_	_
NJ	5,904,000	3,283,568	55.62	_	_	53.29	2.33	51.51	4.11	_	_	55.00	0.62
NM	1,346,000	791,975	58.84	_		47.62	11.22	47.37	11.47	-	_	50.96	7.88
NC	6,423,000	4,224,124	65.77	56.36	9.41	_	_	46.13	19.64	50.07	15.70	_	_
OK	2,561,000	1,346,267	52.57	57.23	-4.66	_		48.89	3.68	55.75	-3.18	_	_
RI	790,000	402,450	50.94	_	_	52.25	-1.31	48.97	1.97	_	_	55.12	-4 .18
SC	3,224,000	1,824,942	56.60	51.49	5.11	_	_	41.33	15.27	44.90	11.70	_	_
SD	573,000	380,575	66.42	69.61	-3.19	_	_	61.34	5.08	66.24	0.18	_	_
TN	4,512,000	2,411,955	53.46	_	_	45.66	7.80	44.27	9.19	_	_	43.92	9.54
TX	14,886,000	7,895,258	53.04	_	_	46.83	6.21	43.70	9.34	_	_	48.52	4.52
VA	5,560,000	3,407,338	61.28	_	_	53.45	7.83	48.25	13.03	_	_	47.12	14.16
WV	1,428,000	696,871	48.80	_	_	43.11	5.69	43.13	5.67	_		46.97	1.83
WY	388,000	242,963	62.62	_	_	59.02	3.60	61.18	1.44	_	_	57.27	5.35
Overa	all:					-							
	105,551,000	62,025,539	58.76	57.82	0.95	52.02	6.74	49.78	8.99	52.77	5.99	52.81	5.95

TX_00001774 JA_004533

Case 193:13-60128-RMC-BS+121W66-37cuFileH 211-121 Hild 10 1/26/12 PAGG-1450 1925

Democratic Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 U.S. Senate - General Races

			2008	2	004	20	000	1	996	1	992	19	988 ——
	00001/45	_ 2008	% VAP	% VAP		% VAP			+/-08-96		+/-08-92	% VAP	+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	750,518	22.11	17.80	4.31	_	_	21.48	0.63	33.76	-11.65		_
AR	2,065,000	798,614	38.67	28.76	9.91		_	21.33	17.34	31.30	7.37	_	_
CO	3,219,000	1,065,232	33.09	34.68	-1.59		_	24.28	8.81	32.08	1.01	_	_
DE	630,000	257,484	40.87	-	-	31.80	9.07	30.42	10.45	_		19.21	21.66
GA	6,302,000	1,727,626	27.41	21.36	6.05	24.72	2.69	20.65	6.76	22.72	4.69	_	_
ID	1,024,000	219,092	21.40	0.43	20.97	_	_	24.08	-2.68	28.54	-7.14	_	_
H_	8,540,000	2,843,991	33.30	42.50	-9.20	_	_	28.83	4.47	32.47	0.83	_	_
IA	2,201,000	930,514	42.28	18.96	23.32	_	_	30.07	12.21	17.06	25.22	_	_
KS	1,968,000	429,691	21.83	16.01	5.82	-	_	24.74	-2.91	19.29	2.54	_	_
KY	3,147,000	846,221	26.89	27.58	-0.69	_	_	19.25	7.64	30.14	-3.25	_	-
LA	3,338,000	986,411	29.55	26.77	2.78	_	_	27.36	2.19	22.04	7.51		_
ME	1,048,000	258,761	24.69	_	_	20.43	4.26	28.26	-3.57	_	_	51.26	-26.57
MA	4,625,000	1,958,404	42.34	_	-	42.19	0.15	30.01	12.33	_	_	39.05	3.29
MI	7,490,000	3,033,550	40.50	_	-	28.92	11.58	31.49	9.01		_	31.90	8.60
MN	3,824,000	1,211,167	31.67	_	_	33.52	-1.85	32.40	-0.73	_	_	27.59	4.08
MS	2,151,000	522,419	24.29	_	_	15.28	9.01	12.19	12.10		_	24.31	-0.02
MT	731,000	334,732	45.79	_	_	28.98	16.81	31.80	13.99	-	_	30.95	14.84
NE	1,243,000	304,383	24.49	_	_	28.92	-4.43	23.63	0.86			33.43	-8.94
NH	1,016,000	337,201	33.19	22.89	10.30	_	-	26.05	7.14	28.21	4.98	_	_
NJ	5,904,000	1,823,715	30.89	_	_	26.71	4.18	27.14	3.75	_	-	29.45	1.44
NM	1,346,000	485,036	36.04	_	_	29.38	6.66	14.11	21.93	_	_	32.26	3.78
NC	6,423,000	2,225,027	34.64	26.50	8.14	_	_	21.18	13.46	23.19	11.45	_	_
OK	2,561,000	527,528	20.60	23.61	-3.01	_	_	19.59	1.01	21.29	-0.69	_	_
RI	790,000	295,614	37.42	_		21.50	15.92	31.09	6.33	_	_	25.03	12.39
SC	3,224,000	773,940	24.01	22.71	1.30	_	_	18.18	5.83	22.48	1.53	_	_
SD	573,000	237,816	41.50	34.40	7.10	_	_	31.48	10.02	42.99	-1.49	_	_
TN	4,512,000	762,779	16.91	_	_	14.71	2.20	16.30	0.61	_	_	28.59	-11.68
TX	14,886,000	3,383,890	22.73		_	15.1 5	7.58	19.20	3.53	_	_	28.71	-5.98
VA	5,560,000	2,189,516	39.38	_	_	25.48	13.90	22.87	16.51	_	_	33.57	5.81
W∨	1,428,000	444,107	31.10	_	-	33.52	-2.42	33.06	-1.96	_	_	30.42	0.68
WY	388,000	58,749	15.14		_	13.01	2.13	25.83	-10.69	_	_	28.42	-13.28
Overa	ali:												
	105,551,000	32,023,728	30.34	27.12	3.22	24.44	5.90	24.08	6.26	26.74	3.60	30.95	-0.61

TX_00001775 JA_004534

Case 193:13-60128-RMC-BS+1921W6-BJcuFileH 211-1214-16d-001/26/12 PPRG-1406F125

Republican Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 U.S. Senate - General Races

			2008	20	004——	2	000	 19	996 ——	19	992	19	988 ——
		2008			+/-08-04		+/-08-00	% VAP		% VAP		% VAP	+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	1,302,316	38.37	37.16	1.21	_	_	24.78	13.59	17.23	21.14		_
CO	3,219,000	890,188	27.65	31.45	-3.80		_	26.88	0.77	26.46	1.19		_
DE	630,000	140,584	22.31	_	_	25.02	-2.71	19.32	2.99	-	_	31.42	- 9.11
GA	6,302,000	1,841,454	29.22	30.93	-1.71	16.10	13.12	20.09	9.13	22.00	7.22	_	_
ID	1,024,000	369,900	36.12	51.69	-15.57	_	_	34.41	1.71	37.10	-0.98	_	_
IL	8,540,000	1,476,083	17.28	16.43	0.85	_	_	20.91	-3.63	26.25	-8.97	_	_
IA	2,201,000	556,206	25.27	47.73	-22.46	_	_	27.11	-1.84	43.66	-18.39	_	_
KS	1,968,000	712,396	36.20	40.27	- 4.07	_	_	30.78	5.42	38.98	-2.78	_	_
KY	3,147,000	952,623	30.27	28.31	1.96		_	24.92	5.35	17.16	13.11	_	_
LA	3,338,000	866,624	25.96	28.77	-2.81		_	27.18	-1.22	3.54	22.42	_	_
ME	1,048,000	408,459	38.98	_	_	45.36	-6.38	31.68	7.30	_	_	11.86	27.12
MA	4,625,000	922,409	19.94	_	_	7.46	12.48	25.70	-5.76	_	_	20.39	-0.45
MI	7,490,000	1,639,165	21.88	_		27.97	-6.09	21.52	0.36	_	-	20.32	1.56
MN	3,824,000	1,211,644	31.69	_	_	29.72	1.97	26.59	5.10	_	_	37.88	-6.19
MS	2,151,000	646,394	30.05	_	_	31.86	-1.81	31.62	-1.57	_	_	28.43	1.62
MT	731,000	125,478	17.17	_	_	31.01	-13.84	28.68	-11.51	_	_	33.35	-16.18
NE	1,243,000	439,281	35.34	_	_	27.68	7.66	31.85	3.49	_	_	24.56	10.78
NH	1,016,000	291,434	28.68	45.03	-16.35		_	27.76	0.92	29.96	-1.28	_	_
NJ	5,904,000	1,394,761	23.62		_	25.10	-1.48	21.93	1.69	_		24.85	-1.23
NM	1,346,000	306,939	22.80	_	_	18.22	4.58	30.66	-7.86	_		18.70	4.10
NC	6,423,000	1,867,217	29.07	29.08	-0.01	_	_	24.28	4.79	25.21	3.86	_	_
oĸ	2,561,000	763,063	29.80	30.20	-0.40	_	_	27.71	2.09	32.64	- 2.84	_	_
RI	790,000	106,836	13.52	-	-	29.72	-16.20	17.17	-3.65	_	_	30.09	-16.57
SC	3,224,000	1,051,002	32.60	27.63	4.97		_	22.06	10.54	21.08	11.52	_	_
SD	573,000	142,759	24.91	35.20	-10.29		_	29.86	-4.95	21.53	3.38	_	_
TN	4,512,000	1,571,637	34.83	_	-	29.72	5.11	27.17	7.66	_	_	15.16	19.67
TX	14,886,000	4,326,639	29.07	_	_	30.45	-1.38	23.93	5.14	_	_	19.41	9.66
VA	5,560,000	1,176,351	21.16	_	_	27.93	-6.77	25.32	-4.16	_	_	13.52	7.64
WV	1,428,000	252,764	17.70	_	_	8.69	9.01	10.07	7.63	_	_	16.55	1.15
WY	388,000	184,214	47.48	_	_	43.54	3.94	33.08	14.40	_		28.84	18.64
Overa	all:												
	103,486,000	27,936,820	27.00	29.88	-2.88	25.63	1.36	24.43	2.56	24.33	2.67	21.37	5.63

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Total Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 Governor - General Races

			2008	2	004	2	000	1:	996	1	992	19	988 ——
		2008	% VAP	% VAP	+/-08-04	% VAP	+/-08-00	% VAP	+/-08-96	% VAP	+/-08-92	% VAP	+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points								
DE	630,000	395,199	62.73	60.53	2.20	56.67	6.06	49.84	12.89	54.32	8.41	49.89	12.84
IN	4,586,000	2,693,606	58.74	54.30	4.44	49.29	9.45	49.16	9.58	54.03	4.71	53.40	5.34
MO	4,328,000	2,869,707	66.31	64.34	1.97	57.10	9.21	53.71	12.60	61.06	5.25	56.01	10.30
MT	731,000	464,774	63.58	63.46	0.12	61.13	2.45	63.81	-0.23	68.89	-5.31	64.62	-1.04
NH	1,016,000	639,407	62.93	68.34	-5.41	62.02	0.91	56.93	6.00	61.97	0.96	56.44	6.49
NC	6,423,000	4,216,998	65.65	56.59	9.06	50.19	15.46	46.30	19.35	50.40	15.25	45.21	20.44
ND	485,000	315,062	64.96	64.42	0.54	60.80	4.16	56.23	8.73	65.84	-0.88	65.16	-0.20
UΤ	1,578,000	877,960	55.64	60.88	-5.24	53.09	2.55	51.33	4.31	66.66	-11.02	62.66	-7.02
VT	495,000	294,958	59.59	64.84	-5.25	64.36	-4.77	57.87	1.72	67.87	-8.28	60.27	-0.68
WV	1,428,000	700,401	49.05	51.89	-2.84	46.29	2.76	45.51	3.54	48.46	0.59	48.08	0.97
Overa	all:												
	21,700,000	13,468,072	62.06	58.90	3.17	52.97	9.10	50.38	11.69	56.31	5.75	52.71	9.35

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Democratic Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 Governor - General Races

			2008	20	004	2	000	 1	996 ——	1:	992 ——	19	988 ——
		2008	% VAP	% VAP	+/-08-04	% VAP	+/-08-00	% VAP	+/-08-96	% VAP	+/-08-92	% VAP	+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
DE	630,000	266,858	42.36	30.79	11.57	33.57	8.79	34.61	7.75	35.17	7.19	14.60	27.76
IN	4,586,000	1,078,448	23.52	24.70	-1.18	27.88	-4.36	25.33	-1.81	33.50	-9.98	28.40	-4.88
MO	4,328,000	1,675,270	38.71	30.79	7.92	28.05	10.66	30.70	8.01	35.83	2.88	19.47	19.24
MT	731,000	303,415	41.51	32.01	9.50	28.78	12.73	13.29	28.22	33.52	7.99	29.81	11.70
NH	1,016,000	447,589	44.05	34.70	9.35	30.22	13.83	32.55	11.50	24.76	19.29	22.04	22.01
NC	6,423,000	2,117,745	32.97	31.47	1.50	26.11	6.86	25.92	7.05	26.57	6.40	19.86	13.11
ND	485,000	74,144	15.29	17.65	-2.36	27.34	-12.05	19.01	-3.72	26.75	-11.46	39.02	-23.73
UT	1,578,000	172,646	10.94	25.17	-14.23	22.44	-11.50	11.96	-1.02	15.49	-4.55	24.07	-13.13
VT	495,000	62,256	12.58	24.60	-12.02	32.47	-19.89	40.81	-28.23	50.72	-38.14	33.36	-20.78
WV	1,428,000	488,837	34.23	32.93	1.30	23.20	11.03	20.85	13.38	27.16	7.07	28.31	5.92
Over	all:												-
	21,700,000	6,687,208	30.82	29.21	1.61	27.08	3.74	25.77	5.05	30.34	0.48	23.69	7.12

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Republican Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 Governor - General Races

			2008	 2	004	2	000	1	996 ——	1	992	19	988
		2008	% VAP	% VAP	+/-08-04	% VAP	+/-08-00	% VAP	+/-08-96	% VAP	+/-08-92	% VAP	+/-08-88
ST	2008 VAP	Turnout	Voted	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
DE	630,000	126,660	20.10	27.71	-7.61	22.52	-2.42	15.19	4.91	17.79	2.31	35.29	-15.19
IN	4,586,000	1,557,965	33.97	28.90	5.07	20.54	13.43	23.00	10.97	19.94	14.03	25.00	8.97
MO	4,328,000	1,133,779	26.20	32.70	-6.50	27.53	-1.33	21.72	4.48	25.23	0.97	35.97	-9.77
MT	731,000	151,941	20.79	29.21	-8.42	31.17	-10.38	50.51	-29.72	35.37	-14.58	33.56	-12.77
NH	1,016,000	176,739	17.40	33.64	-16.24	27.14	-9.74	22.49	-5.09	34.71	-17.31	34.11	-16.71
NC	6,423,000	1,978,084	30.80	24.27	6.53	23.22	7.58	19.80	11.00	21.79	9.01	25.35	5.45
ND	485,000	234,527	48.36	45.90	2.46	33.46	14.90	37.22	11.14	38.10	10.26	26.14	22.22
UT	1,578,000	682,409	43.25	35.15	8.10	29.61	13.64	38.48	4.77	28.12	15.13	25.14	18.11
VT	495,000	161,423	32.61	38.06	- 5.45	24.42	8.19	12.99	19.62	15.64	16.97	26.10	6.51
WV	1,428,000	180,353	12.63	17.68	-5.05	21.85	-9.22	23.50	-10.87	17.73	-5.10	19.78	-7.15
Overa	all:					·							
	21,700,000	6,383,880	29.42	28.79	0.63	24.55	4.87	23.67	5.75	23.36	6.05	28.04	1.38

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Case 193:13-60128-RMC-BS+121W66-37cuFileH 211-121 Hild 10 1/26/12 PAGG 2506 F125

Total Highest Statewide Turnout as a Percentage of VAP - Citizen 2008 vs 2004 - 1988 General Election Races

00,11			0000			<u>.</u>							
			2008	_	004		000 —		996		992		988 ——
ST	2008 VAP	2008 Turnout		% VAP Voted	+/-08-04 Points		+/-08-00	% VAP	+/-08-96	% VAP	+/-08-92	% VAP	
						Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points	Voted	Points
AL	3,394,000	2,091,143	61.61	56.34	5.27	50.74	10.87	48.34	13.27	55.73	5.88	47.26	14.35
AR	2,065,000	1,075,428	52.08	52.35	-0.27	47.05	5.03	47.14	4.94	53.74	-1.66	48.75	3.33
AZ	4,117,000	1,886,811	45.83	52.96	-7.13	44.57	1.26	45.10	0.73	54.49	-8.66	48.42	-2.59
CO	3,219,000	2,110,209	65.55	68.30	-2.75	57.91	7.64	54.13	11.42	62.64	2.91	57.69	7.86
CT	2,518,000	1,567,752	62.26	64.02	-1.76	60.61	1.65	57.83	4.43	66.90	-4.64	60.44	1.82
DC	371,000	226,573	61.07	58.66	2.41	49.48	11.59	43.70	17.37	51.49	9.58	42.39	18.68
DE	630,000	403,631	64.07	62.22	1.85	57.36	6.71	50.66	13.41	56.81	7.26	51.95	12.12
FL	12,923,000	8,072,686	62.47	62.77	-0.30	53.22	9.25	50.57	11.90	55.09	7.38	48.71	13.76
GA	6,302,000	3,862,027	61.28	54.72	6.56	45.41	15.87	43.01	18.27	47.58	13.70	40.24	21.04
HI	918,000	415,995	45.32	48.48	- 3.16	43.44	1.88	44.08	1.24	47.74	-2.42	47.96	-2.64
IA	2,201,000	1,515,815	68.87	69.28	-0.41	61.27	7.60	58.51	10.36	65.73	3.14	59.96	8.91
ID	1,024,000	651,714	63.64	61.88	1.76	55.74	7.90	60.34	3.30	66.14	-2.50	60.68	2.96
IL	8,540,000	5,339,577	62.52	62.31	0.21	56.50	6.02	52.14	10.38	62.32	0.20	57.06	5.46
IN	4,586,000	2,737,551	59.69	54.74	4.95	49.75	9.94	49.76	9.93	55.89	3.80	54.09	5.60
KS	1,968,000	1,206,127	61.29	61.26	0.03	56.25	5.04	57.60	3.69	63.87	-2.58	56.14	5.15
KY	3,147,000	1,828,097	58.09	58.21	-0.12	51.25	6.84	47.74	10.35	53.76	4.33	49.22	8.87
LA	3,338,000	1,958,059	58.66	59.28	-0.62	55.06	3.60	57.23	1.43	59.61	-0.95	55.59	3.07
MA	4,625,000	3,047,312	65.89	63.77	2.12	60.35	5.54	57.51	8.38	62.87	3.02	60.72	5.17
MD	4,064,000	2,312,316	56.90	61.04	-4.14	54.36	2.54	49.18	7.72	56.55	0.35	50.89	6.01
ME	1,048,000	674,670	64.38	73.34	-8.96	67.55	-3.17	64.41	-0.03	74.10	-9.72	63.12	1.26
MI	7,490,000	4,993,499	66.67	66.08	0.59	59.35	7.32	55.20	11.47	63.02	3.65	55.29	11.38
MN	3,824,000	2,901,017	75.86	76.75	-0.89	69.18	6.68	64.68	11.18	72.65	3.21	67.53	8.33
MO	4,328,000	2,916,663	67.39	64.62	2.77	57.46	9.93	54.10	13.29	62.30	5.09	56.22	11.17
MS	2,151,000	1,212,506	56.37	54.10	2.27	48.36	8.01	45.80	10.57	52.59	3.78	52.74	3.63
MT	731,000	472,014	64.57	64.07	0.50	61.34	3.23	64.17	0.40	69.36	-4.79	64.62	-0.05
NC	6,423,000	4,256,702	66.27	56.83	9.44	50.19	16.08	46.30	19.97	50.73	15.54	45.21	21.06
ND	485,000	315,987	65.15	65.04	0.11	60.80	4.35	56.68	8.47	66.55	-1.40	65.36	-0.21
NE	1,243,000	767,057	61.71	63.11	-1.40	57.09	4.62	56.78	4.93	63.95	-2.24	58.95	2.76
NH	1,016,000	662,456	65.20	70.01	-4.81	62.54	2.66	57.18	8.02	64.58	0.62	57.61	7.59
NJ	5,904,000	3,653,773	61.89	62.41	-0.52	56.32	5.57	54.93	6.96	60.43	1.46	57.06	4.83
NM	1,346,000	798,986	59.36	58.35	1.01	48.35	11.01	47.73	11.63	53.17	6.19	52.23	7.13
NV	1,642,000	965,120	58.78	55.31	3.47	45.48	13.30	39.75	19.03	53.02	5.76	43.70	15.08
NY	12,653,000	7,011,244	55.41	58.83	-3.42	54.69	0.72	50.74	4.67	55.84	-0.43	52.66	2.75
ОН	8,562,000	5,227,180	61.05	66.54	-5.49	56.40	4.65	55.29	5.76	61.51	-0.46	55.69	5.36
OK	2,561,000	1,461,931	57.08	57.90	-0.82	49.55	7.53	49.86	7.22	59.88	-2.80	52.00	5.08
PA	9,450,000	5,830,312	61.70	61.88	-0.18	53.60	8.10	49.60	12.10	55.15	6.55	51.00	10.70
RI	790,000	434,411	54.99	56.70	-1.71	54.58	0.41	52.60	2.39	61.61	-6.62	56.04	-1.05
SC	3,224,000	1,889,399	58.60	52.15	6.45	46.71	11.89	41.33	17.27	45.74	12.86	40.07	
SD	573,000	381,876	66.65	69.61	-2.96	57.82	8.83	61.34	5.31	66.58	0.07	63.62	18.53 3.03
TN	4,512,000	8,106,823	179.67	55.67	124.00	49.15	130.52	47.14	132.53	52.77	126.90	45.86	
TX	14,886,000	8,045,310	54.05	52.23	1.82	47.80	6.25	44.36	9.69	52.77	1.61	49.47	133.81
UT	1,578,000	883,658	56.00	61.41	-5.41	53.71	2.29						4.58
VA	5,560,000	3,460,712	62.24	59.91	2.33	53.86	8.38	51.33 49.52	4.67	66.66 55.16	-10.66	62.66	-6.66
VT	495,000	302,337	61.08	65.47	-4.39	64.54	-3.46	49.52 58.74	12.72 2.34	55.16	7.08	49.91	12.33
WI	4,183,000	2,965,159	70.89	73.82	-4.39 -2.93	66.31	-3.46 4.58	58.74 57.98		68.81	-7.73 1.14	60.38	0.70
W/	1,428,000	707,702	49.56	53.40	-2.93 -3.84	46.29	4.58 3.27		12.91	69.75	1.14	62.46	8.43
WY	388,000	246,329	63.49	64.74	-3.6 4 -1.25	60.32	3.27 3.17	46.09 61.32	3.47	50.42	-0.86	48.36	1.20
		270,323	00.48	04.74	-1.25		3.17	01.32	2.17	61.72	1.77	57.27	6.22
Overa		440.050.055	00.5		<u> </u>							_	
	178,424,000	173,853,656	63.81	60.54	3.27	53.92	9.89	51.10	12.71	57.89	5.92	52.94	10.87

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The Empirical Effects of Voter-ID Laws: Present or Absent?

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he effect of voter-identification (voter-ID) laws on turnout is a hot-button issue in contemporary American politics. In April of 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Indiana's voter-ID law, the nation's most rigorous, which requires voters to arrive at the polls with a state-issued photo ID containing an expiration date (Crawford v. Marion County 2008). In a famous incident highlighting how Hoosiers were dealing with their state's voter-ID law, representative Julia Carson (D-IN) was initially blocked from voting during Indiana's 2006 primary election for failing to comply with Indiana's voteridentification standard. Carson identified herself with her congressional ID card; since that card did not include an expiration date and therefore did not meet Indiana's voteridentification law, she was turned away at the polls before later being allowed to vote (Goldstein 2006). The rising wave of public, political, and legal debate crested two years later in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling and during the Indiana primaries, with reports of a dozen nuns being denied ballots at the polls due to their lack of appropriate identification (Urbina 2008).

While political science research regarding the impact of voter-ID laws on turnout is scarce, a growing community of scholars is examining whether voter-ID requirements affect behavior. Though reservations regarding the fairness of these laws persist, we address the question of whether strict voteridentification requirements have (already) systematically affected voter turnout at the aggregate or individual levels. The early evidence paints an incomplete picture, consisting of some qualified claims that states with stricter voteridentification laws negatively, albeit marginally, affect turnout (Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2007; Eagleton Institute of Politics and Moritz College of Law 2006; Vercellotti and Anderson 2006), while other reports find that these effects are too small to be of practical concern (Ansolabehere 2007; Muhlhausen and Sikich 2007). Variations in the populations under investigation, the time periods examined, the statistical methods employed, and the specifications of the various models perhaps explain these inconsistencies. But, research is also limited by theoretical shortcomings about why voter-ID laws should impact turnout.

In this article, we argue that voter-ID laws should have little to no effect on aggregate or individual-level turnout, particularly after considering political motivations for voting. This is not to claim that voter-ID laws will not have an impact on future voting nor are we arguing no one is impacted by voter-ID laws, rather we suggest that these laws have *not* had a significant impact on voting thus far. Moreover, given the get-out-the-vote initiatives and grassroots programs designed to increase civic engagement and inform voters, we expect that members of the electorate who are interested in voting are more likely to do so regardless of the state laws requiring various forms of identification.

While there are many examples of anecdotal evidence in the debate over disenfranchisement and voter-identification laws, like the one with which we open this article,¹ we chose to put the question of the impact of voter-ID laws to an empirical test.² Using multiple data sources, we explored whether strict voter-identification laws affect voter turnout at both the aggregate (state) and individual level. We find that voter-identification laws do not affect voter turnout, and as a result we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effects. In the sections below we review our reasoning, data, and findings, and provide discussion and conclusions regarding the impact of voter-ID laws on turnout.

VOTER IDENTIFICATION AND TURNOUT

We argue that socio-demographic and political motivational factors are far more determinative of voting than the imposition of identification laws.3 On the one hand, education remains a crucial factor that drives turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980)4 and perhaps more importantly, political interest (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) is a strong and consistent force behind the decision to vote. Indeed, this supports earlier claims from The American Voter, where Campbell et al. wrote that "the stronger the individual's psychological involvement [in political matters] the more likely he is to participate in politics by voting" (1960, 102). On the other hand, the personal cost of voting is a potentially important part of the decision calculus as well (Downs 1957). Recent voter-ID laws potentially increase this cost in at least two ways. First, voters who fail to supply the necessary identification may be turned away without voting. Second, there are sometimes monetary and preparation costs associated with voter-ID laws that voters must incur. These costs may be relatively low or high depending on a voter's level of sophistication, work flexibility, or income.

Yet, voters who are interested in politics should be able to overcome the potential institutional barrier of strict voter-identification requirements while citizens who are

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uninterested in politics should be less likely to vote regardless of the nature of a state's voter-identification law. Moreover, many individuals who plan to participate in elections have already overcome any potential costs by having obtained government-issued identification, as well as other less stringent forms of ID. Thus, we hypothesize that voters with higher levels of interest in politics are more likely to vote, and are less affected by voter-identification laws.

From a theoretical standpoint, the voters most likely to be negatively affected by voter-identification laws are those who are interested in voting, but do not know and or have the proper identification. This population may include groups such as first-time voters, those not wanting to interact with government, or those whose IDs have recently expired. For now, we are less concerned about the average member of the electorate not having a single form of government-issued identification. The data on voting-age citizens by demographic characteristics with or without photo identification is quite limited; however, recent data collected on six states (see Barreto, Nuño, and Sanchez 2009 for an estimate of Indiana) show that while 15% of the voting-age population lacks the necessary identification to vote, 20% of minorities are lacking. However, not all the states examined (e.g., Wisconsin, California, Washington, or New Mexico) require government-issued photo ID, and these data cannot sufficiently say whether such an estimate has any relation to voting behavior, although there is the implication.

States requiring a photo ID to vote, including Indiana, have made special efforts to publicize the need for proper ID and encourage citizens to secure identification. For example, the State of Indiana spent \$1.25 million on an outreach program to inform voters of the change in identification requirements, and its secretary of state's office estimates that it increased its outreach efforts by 50% during the 2008 primary election season (Indiana Secretary of State 2008). In addition to outreach efforts, Indiana's identification law was written to make acquiring a state-issued identification relatively painless. First, Public Law 109-2005 requires that the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) issue any voting eligible citizen a free voter-ID card, which is valid for six years, upon request. Aside from monetary costs, time costs-in Indiana at least-also appear to be relatively low. The BMV estimates that the average visit time to one of the 146 statewide BMV offices is eight minutes, with the longest average visit time in the state at 14 minutes (Indiana BMV 2008a). Between January 1, 2007, and May 6, 2008, the BMV issued 257,100 free identification cards (Indiana BMV 2008b).5 Therefore, the biggest impediment to acquiring identification is a trip to the BMV; a trip that is likely to be a bit further than the distance travelled to a polling place, but made only once every six years.6

The lead Supreme Court opinion in *Crawford* concurred with Indiana's position that requiring photo identification was minimally burdensome (*Crawford* v. *Marion County* 2008). In two dissenting opinions, Justices Souter and Breyer were less sanguine about the ease of availability of appropriate ID for the poor, the disabled, and the elderly. So while average visit times to the Indiana BMV are quite low, certain voters (first time voters, minorities, seniors, etc.) may face more individ-

ual scrutiny than others and face longer visit times. This may account for the disparity between the systematic state data on average visit time and anecdotal evidence of individual voters who faced difficulty in securing a free voter-identification card. Presently, there is extremely limited data regarding this claim.

In fact, efforts at making registration and voting easier have increased registration and turnout only among those groups most likely to register and vote before the new measures were implemented (Berinsky 2005) while occasionally providing a modest increase in the number of voters casting a ballot (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007). According to Berinsky, "Individuals who utilize easy voting procedures tend to be more politically engaged and interested than those who do not take advantage of the opportunity" (2005, 482). Thus, we argue that voters who are interested enough to register and turn out to vote would also understand and secure the necessary form of identification needed to cast a ballot. We expect the individual motivation to participate in politics to not only minimize the empirical effects of voter-ID laws, but also to trump them when considered together.

DATA AND METHODS

We tested our hypothesis using both aggregate and individual-level data. We collected aggregate data across four federal elections from 2000 to 2006. At the individual level, we examined data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Our main theoretical variables of interest are voter turnout and strictness of voter-identification laws. Aggregate turnout is the percentage of the voting-age population that actually voted in the 2000 through 2006 elections, and individual turnout is a self-reported measure (1= voted, 0 = did not vote) captured during the 2006 CCES interviews. Strictness of voter-identification laws is measured using a six-point Guttman scale called ID Requirement, and we also consider a dummy variable indicating whether a state requires a photo ID or not (1 = photo ID required, 0 = not).8

Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we examined the bivariate relationships among turnout and state-ID law using analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques. Second, we provided hierarchical regression model results for the turnout—state-ID-law relationship, controlling for other factors. In our aggregate data multivariate analysis, we examined a baseline model using only demographics and time (Model 1), then added the voter-identification law variables to the model (Model 2), before finally adding political variables to the model (Model 3). This allows us to reveal the effects of each variable of interest after controlling for other factors; thus, variables entered later are only allowed to account for variance unexplained by factors entered earlier. We used this same approach for our individual-level analysis using the 2006 CCES.

VOTER-ID LAW AND TURNOUT

Bivariate Results

Table 1 reports the distribution of states' identification requirements along with turnout at both the aggregate and individual level. The distribution of voting-ID requirements reveals

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Table 1 Mean Turnout by Identification Requirement, 2000–2006

		200))	2002		200	4	2006		
	IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT	N.	N	11	N		N	11	N	
Aggregate Turnout	State Name	68.9%	10	48.6%	11	70.5%	10	45.5%	10	
	Sign Name	66.1%	19	47.2%	19	70.3%	16	42.8%	13	
Maria Carallel Control	Match Signature	66.1%	8	40.6%	8	71.7%	7	40.0%	6	
	ID with Name	66.0%	10	46.8%	10	70.9%	15	44.2%	17	
PP PPP - UP - RABERT - BARRES BLV - ST	Photo ID	57.7%	1	44.2%	1	70.1%	2	37.7%	3	
	Photo ID +		0		0		0	36.6%	· · · · · · · · 1	
Expression of the control of the con	Total*	66.5%	48	46.3%	49	70.7%	50	43.1%	50	
Individual Turnout (CCES)	State Name		-	<u> </u>		I	-	63%	3905	
	Sign Name						# - /	66%	9521	
	Match Signature			-	-		-	71%	5623	
Continue ostalization a continue de la continue de	ID with Name			-				67%	12780	
	Photo ID	-	- 4-				- 1	63%	3598	
	Photo ID +	100 J		<u> </u>	-		1 4 n L 1 1 n	57%	975	
	Total	-			-		- 1	66%	36402	

Note. ANOVA F-tests comparing aggregate mean turnout across identification requirement categories reveal no significant mean differences within years; however turnout in 2000 and 2004 were significantly higher than turnout in 2002 and 2006 (see ANOVA results in the text). Source: Aggregate data gathered by the authors and 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES).

considerable variation across the states. In the 2000, 2002, and 2004 elections the majority of states required less demanding standards of stating or signing one's name in order to cast a regular ballot; yet, by 2006, we found the slight majority of states at the top end of the scale requiring items such as a photo identification and a signature.

A two-way random effects analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing mean turnout across election year, voter identification laws, and the interaction between the two reveals only the year variable reaching statistical significance (F[3,5,545] = 140.1, p < 0.01). Post-hoc Bonferonni adjusted t-tests indicate lower turnout in the midterm election years (2002 and 2006), and higher turnout in presidential election years (2000 and 2004). Both the voter-identification requirement variable (F[5,29] = 2.35, n.s.), and the interaction of year and voteridentification requirement (F[12,161] = 0.46, n.s.) were nonsignificant predictors of state-level turnout. Using the same random effects model, we also found no statistically significant relationship when treating our Guttman scale measure of identification stringency as an ordinal covariate ($\beta = -0.81$, SE = 0.46, n.s.). Thus, controlling for the election year, state voter-identification laws produced no statistically significant effects on aggregate state-level turnout. This simple analysis suggests that from 2000 to 2006, state-level aggregate turnout and voter-ID requirements were unrelated.

Examining CCES data in Table 1, self-reported turnout appears to be lowest at the most stringent ID requirement; however, we examined the pattern across all stringency levels.

We estimated the relationship between voter-ID laws and turnout using multi-level logistic regression (1 = voted, 0 = did not vote) with state as the cluster variable (i.e., the random factor), and voter-ID law as the predictor. When the voter-ID law variable is treated as ordinal (β = 0.01, SE = 0.04, n.s.) the results show a non-significant positive relationship, and when it is treated as photo ID required or not (β = -0.33, SE = 0.18, n.s.) the result is a negative coefficient, but it is not statistically significant. In both cases, states with strict voter-ID requirements did not significantly reduce the probability of individual-level turnout.

Multivariate Results

Having shown state voting-requirement laws have no significant effect on state-level turnout, we turn to more rigorous analyses to illustrate the factors that should matter. To save space in the symposium, we do not report the large table containing the results of a random effects general linear model with maximum likelihood estimation clustering on state explaining turnout in four elections, 2000 through 2006.9 Our analysis begins by accounting for demographic variables and time. These variables have been shown to be consistent predictors of turnout in the voting behavior literature. *Population* measures the size of each state's voting age population as measured by the Census. **O Percent black* and percent Hispanic* measure the percentage of each state's citizens who are black and Hispanic, respectively. We also control for states in the South and interact South and percent Black* to control for differences

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^{*} North Dakota and Wisconsin are omitted in 2000 and Wisconsin is omitted in 2002 because the turnout data was not available for the states. In each of the three cases, however, state law required the standard of stating one's name to cast a regular ballot.

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in southern states percentages of black voters. Percent college is a variable indicating the percentage of college graduates in each state and percent urban indicates the percentage of citizens living in urban areas. This basic model does a good job of explaining aggregate turnout with statewide turnout as the dependent variable. The results of the base model are consistent with the expectations established in the turnout literature with the variables accounting for race, education, and the South reaching statistical significance. The dummy variables for election year indicate that as expected, turnout was statistically higher in presidential election years (2000 and 2004). In our second and third models we added two different measures of identification requirements, the Guttman scale variable ID Requirement and a dummy variable Photo ID respectively. 11 Neither ID Requirement nor Photo ID reached statistical significance.

In the final two iterations of the aggregate model we included legal and political control variables. First we controlled for three legal factors: voter-ID requirements (ID requirement), the number of days between each state's voterregistration deadline and Election Day (days), and a dichotomous variable indicating whether a state's election laws changed with respect to voter ID since the previous election (requirement change).12 If voter-ID laws depress turnout, they would be most likely to do so during the first election following a change in the requirements. We controlled for electionspecific characteristics that could affect turnout. Senate race and gubernatorial race are dichotomous variables indicating whether there was a Senate or gubernatorial race in a state during an election year. Spending measures the total amount of spending in 2004 dollars by federal candidates in each year as reported by candidates to the Federal Election Commission.13 We also controlled for social issues through a variable that indicates the number of social issues (abortion, same sex marriage, or stem cell research) that were on the ballot in a state during each election.14 Among these variables only the number of social issues on the ballot (in both models) and federal campaign spending (in the photo-ID model) were statistically significant. The aggregate turnout results reveal no significant relationship between aggregate turnout and voter-ID laws, but many statistically significant relationships among political and demographic factors.

At the individual level there is a similar story. Our selfreported turnout analyses contain socio-demographics (e.g., sex, race, age, region, and socioeconomic status), political affiliation (i.e., party identification), and a 3-point ordinal measure of political interest (1 = not interested to 3 = very muchinterested). By controlling for political interest we tested an alternative hypothesis to the theoretical effects of voter-ID laws proffered by Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (2007) and Vercellotti and Anderson (2006). Even if voter-ID laws do have pronounced empirical effects, once political interest is taken into account, the laws should not matter at all because once the motivation to participate is held constant there is little theoretical reason to believe voter-ID laws would dampen one's desire to vote. Similar to our aggregate analysis, we estimated five models; the first examining demographic factors, the next two examining the effects of voter-ID law, and the fourth and

fifth examining the effects of voter-ID law and a photo-ID requirement controlling for political interest.

Table 2 reports the results of mixed-model logistic regression analyses using states as a random factor variable, and shows that voter-identification laws-stringency and photo-ID required or not-have no statistically significant effects on self-reported turnout. However, political interest has both strong and significant effects. All five models essentially show statistically significant effects of basic demographic variables, but they also show how factors such as race and age can play an important role in voting behavior. Neither voter-ID-law stringency (Model 2) nor photo-ID requirement (Model 3) produced statistically significant effects at the threshold 95% confidence level, nor did they contribute to the explanatory power of the regression model (as indicated by the change in -2LL model fit values), especially when political-interest levels are considered. Of the 10 variables in each of the last two models, political interest has the strongest and most stable effects suggesting that political motivations trump ID requirements.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We are highly sensitive to those who are improperly and unjustifiably denied their right to vote; however, there is limited available data on the incidence of actual exclusion from voting due to the lack of proper identification. This is not to say that actually requiring a more strict form of identification is not on its face discriminatory; it is, and the laws deserve to be scrutinized. But, our question is whether these laws have significantly reduced turnout. Based on our analysis, they have not.

In the CCES, respondents answered questions about whether they were asked to show identification and if they were prevented from voting because of a problem with identification. Ansolabehere (2007) used this data to demonstrate that exclusions from voting are exceptionally rare. Twentytwo respondents out of the 36,421 person sample said voter-ID requirements prevented them from voting. Ansolabehere reports no more than 0.2% of potential voters claimed to have been excluded from voting due to ID requirements, and with no clear demographic pattern among them, there is very little empirical basis to raise the alarm over the implementation of identification requirements.15 As Ansolabehere explains, "one would need a survey more than 10 times as large as this one to begin to gauge who was excluded and why. It is just that rare of a phenomenon" (2007, 8). Indeed, when non-voters in the Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 2000 to 2006 were asked why they did not vote, a lack of interest in politics was given as a reason twice as often as registration problems (which include a variety of issues, many of which are unrelated to having a photo ID at the polls on Election Day). Indeed, according to the CPS, even in states where photo IDs are required, 11.7% of non-voters claim that a lack of interest kept them home in 2006 while 6.3% cited general registration problems. General registration problems could include voters turned away due to a lack of identification but also includes voters who had moved without reregistering, felons, and a litany of other special cases. More telling was that one-third of 2006

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Table 2
Multi-level Model for Binary Outcomes Regression Coefficients Predicting Individual-Level Turnout

	MODEL1 B(SE)	MODEL 2 B (SE)	MODEL3 B(SE)	MODEL 4 B (SE)	MODEL 5 B (SE)
Intercept	-14 (.08)**	-14 (14)**	-1.4 (.08)**	-2.9 (.17)**	-2.8 (.11)**
Age (years)	.02 (.00)**	.02 (.00)**	.02 (.00)**	02 (.00)**	.02 (.00)**
Sex (Male = 1)	.21 (.03)**	.21 (.03)**	.21 (.03)**	.08 (.03)*	.08 (.03)**
Other Race	72 (.04)**	- 72 (.04)**	72 (.04)**	65 (.05)**	65 (.05)**
Black	82 (.05)**	83 (.05)**	82 (.05)**	69 (.06)**	69 (.06)**
Education	.30 (.01)**	.30 (.02)**	.30 (.01)**	.25 (.01)**	.25 (.01)**
Household Income	.04 (.00)**	.03 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.02 (.00)**	.02 (.00)**
Democrat	.13 (.03)**	13 (.03)**	.13 (.03)**	.15 (.04)**	.15 (.04)**
Republican	.10 (,03)**	.10 (.03)**	.10 (.03)**	.15 (.04)**	.15 (04)**
State ID Law Scale (Stringency)		.02 (.04)		.02 (.05)	
State ID Law—Photo ID required			29 (.18)		27 (.23)
Political Interest				.76 (.03)**	.76 (.03)**
Initial -2LL	-17239.4	-17230.4	-17230.4	-11526.7	-11526.6
Final -2LL	-17207.7	-17192.1	-17190.9	-11496.5	-11495.9
Wald χ^2	1992.4**	1994.2**	1996.4**	2315.6**	2316.4**
		a rest California Santa Sas.	i i i sa	C. John Milliesky, Alexandra	A CHIRDING CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF

Note: Analyses are based on unweighted sample CCES data; 2006 Analytic N level 1 = 22,006,

Analytic N level 2 = 49.

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)

CPS respondents from Indiana said they did not vote because they were "too busy," which can arguably be interpreted to mean they were less interested in midterm voting; after all they did respond to the CPS.

At every level of analysis, and with multiple forms of data, we have consistently demonstrated that voter-identification laws appear to be a much smaller piece to the voting behavior puzzle than are factors such as the kinds of issues on a state ballot, the competitiveness of campaigns, the institutional structures of a particular election, socioeconomic factors, and individual-level motivational factors such as interest in politics. This is not to say that the rules of voting are unimportant or that there is no potential for disenfranchisement; rather our findings suggest that voter-ID laws have had no systematic effect on turnout thus far, and that some rules (voter-ID laws) do not affect turnout as much as others (same-day registration in Minnesota, a state with historically high turnout).

While voter-ID laws appear to have little to no main effects on turnout (see Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2007), our central argument is that other individual-level motivations such as interest in politics (Berinsky 2005), types of elections (Gronke, Galenas-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007), and social issues (Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith 2001) would mediate any impacts related to ID rules. While strict ID requirements have the potential to burden some members of the electorate, our analyses suggest that these numbers are small. What's more, actions taken by state governments, interest groups, and political par-

ties are likely strong enough to induce those who are interested in voting, but have no more strict form of ID, to take action to ensure their voice is heard. This form of political resilience is the type we expect, and have seen from racial minorities, women, and other oppressed groups in America's history.

Until there is systematic, empirical evidence of discrimination in the administration or availability of required forms of identification, there is little reason to suspect voter-identification laws will significantly affect turnout. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that voter-ID laws do not significantly affect turnout. While all state-level voting laws should be heavily scrutinized as efforts to stop voter disenfranchisement are paramount, it is time we give some credit to the electorate and as Berinsky (2005) suggests, spend more time searching for ways to increase citizens' interest in politics.

NOTES

- 1. Barreto, Nuño, and Sanchez (2009) report that educated, upper-income whites in Indiana are more likely to have a valid ID, suggesting that Indiana's voter-ID law disenfranchises legal voters; however, their analysis does not attempt to explain voter turnout in Indiana and therefore does not ask respondents about interest in voting or about voting. One can however reasonably conclude that those without identification will be less likely to vote.
- Reconciling anecdotal evidence of voter disenfranchisement with more systematic analysis is a difficult task. To do so we would need reliable,

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^{*} $p \le .05$. ** $p \le .01$.

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- large-scale exit polling data with a special emphasis on including those who were turned away at the polls.
- 3. Little work has been done with respect to voter-identification laws, but scholars have debated the significance of voter-registration laws on turnout for decades. Turnout varies significantly across different socio-demographic groups (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) suggest that in states with restrictive registration laws those with lower levels of education vote less than those who have higher education levels. Nagler (1991) finds that restrictive voter-registration laws have no effect on turnout.
- 4. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) argue that education's effect on voting is "funneled through political interest" (283).
- 5. There is no available data with respect to whether the 257,000 (5.4% of the voting-age population in Indiana) people who secured a free photo ID were registered voters who voted in previous elections (when a photo ID was not required) but would have been prevented from voting under the new law. Without a public-opinion survey oversampling those who have acquired a free photo ID, we cannot know the impact of the secretary of state's efforts to help interested voters acquire the appropriate ID to be able to cast a ballot.
- 6. In addition, the voter-identification law had exceptions for senior citizens born outside of a hospital with no birth certificate issued, the indigent, those with religious objections to being photographed, and those living in state-licensed facilities that also serve as a polling place.
- The CCES was conducted by Polimetrix in the week after the 2006 election. We used the CCES because of its large sample size (n = 36,421), and the inclusion of political variables that we believe will help explain turnout.
- 8. We coded state voter-identification laws based on our reading of state election law and in consultation with state secretaries of state. At the low end of the scale, a 1 represents the least strict standard of a voter stating his or her name to establish identity. A 2 increases in strictness to signing one's name. A 3 is coded as matching one's signature to a signature on file at the polling location. A 4 represents a requirement that a voter present a form of identification that does not include a picture. A 5 is coded as a standard that requires a photo identification. The final level, a 6 includes the strictest requirement of presenting a valid, state-issued photo identification with an expiration date—a standard met only in Indiana. We add the sixth category because the requirements in Indiana are more burdensome than other state's photo-identification requirements. For further elaboration see Mycoff, Wagner, and Wilson (2007).
- 9. For those interested in examining the table, containing the results of the five models described in these pages, contact the authors at mycoff@udel.edu. The analysis includes 197 observations as turnout data was not available for North Dakota in 2000 or for Wisconsin in 2000 and 2002.
- We also estimated the model with registered voters instead of population size; the results were equivalent.
- The Photo ID variable adds levels five and six on our scale together yielding all states that required a photo id.
- 12. We collected the number of days between the registration deadline and Election Day from state laws. The change in election law variable is a dichotomous indicator based on our identification requirement variable.
- 13. We collected financial data from www.fec.gov.
- 14. We collected ballot initiative data using information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (http://www.ncsl.org/index.htm#).
- 15. If, for example, photo identification was the standard nationwide, and we extrapolated from the survey data, then 0.2% of the 125 million who voted in 2004 would equate to approximately 250,000 voters nationwide, or about 5,000 voters per state.

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A REPORT OF THE HERITAGE CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS

NEW ANALYSIS SHOWS VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS DO NOT REDUCE TURNOUT

DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN, PH.D., AND KERI WEBER SIKICH

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New Analysis Shows Voter Identification Laws Do Not Reduce Turnout

DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN, PH.D., AND KERI WEBER SIKICH

OVERVIEW

The 2000 presidential election sparked a firestorm of debate relating to election reform in the United States. Since then, academics, the media, and elected officials have proffered opinions and implemented policies related to this important political issue. Topics that have been addressed in recent years range from modernizing voting machines and updating voter registration rolls to implementing stricter identification requirements for voting.

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). HAVA affects only federal elections and, among other things, requires that the states provide for provisional voting; create a computerized, centralized list of registered voters; and ensure that new voters who register by mail present identification before being allowed to vote in person. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to serve as "a national clearinghouse and resource for information and review of procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections." Additionally, many state legislatures have enacted their own election reform legislation.

Of the many election reforms currently being considered, one that has incited some of the most cantankerous debate is that of voter identification at the polls. For many, the idea of requiring voters to present identification in order to vote is anathema, tantamount to the poll taxes that were once used to prevent African–Americans from voting.⁴ They contend that requiring identification at the polls will lead to lower voter turnout, especially among the poor, certain minorities, and the elderly. For others, such as the Protect Arizona Now organization that lobbied in favor of identification requirements for Arizona voters, the problem of voter fraud makes voter identification requirements a common-sense solution.⁵ The standard argument goes that if a person has to show identification to board a plane or cash a check, why shouldn't he have to do the same in order to vote? Additionally, the proponents of stricter voter identification requirements argue that such a policy would bolster the public's faith in the legitimacy of elections and lead to greater voter turnout, not less.

Both sides raise valid concerns. However, even a cursory glance at the literature on voter identification requirements shows that there is a dearth of

- 1. Public Law 107-252.
- 2. Election Assistance Commission, "About the EAC," at www.eac.gov/about.asp?format=none (June 28, 2007).
- 3. For a review of recent state legislative activity on voter identification laws, see National Council of State Legislatures, "Requirements for Voter Identification," February 1, 2007, at www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/voteridreq.htm (July 23, 2007).
- 4. John Fund, Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004), p. 137.
- 5. Protect Arizona Now, "Background Information," at www.pan2004.com/background.htm (July 24, 2007).

TX_0d001788 JA_004547 empirical research on this issue. While there have been a few studies to address the effect of voter identification requirements using election data, more research is needed in order to appropriately assess the legitimacy of either side's claims.

In response to this debate, the EAC awarded a grant to Rutgers University's Eagleton Institute of Politics and the Moritz College of Law at Ohio State University to study voter identification requirement laws. The resulting study, Report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002,7 included a statistical analysis of the effect of voter identification requirements on voter turnout during the 2004 election by Professor Timothy Vercellotti of the Eagleton Institute.⁸ A new version of the analysis with Timothy Vercellotti and David Anderson as authors was presented to the 2006 American Political Science Association conference. Hereinafter, this study will be referred to as the "Eagleton Institute study."

The Eagleton Institute study found that more stringent voter identification requirements appeared to reduce voter turnout in 2004. In the media, their study has been cited as demonstrating that the strengthening of voter identification requirements to reduce fraud has the side effect of suppressing minority voter turnout. 11

This Center for Data Analysis report attempts to replicate the part of the Eagleton Institute study that used the publicly available November 2004 Current

Population Survey (CPS). ¹² This analysis was done because several aspects of the Eagleton Institute study cast doubt on the validity of its findings:

- The Eagleton Institute used one-tailed hypothesis tests instead of the more commonly accepted two-tailed tests. The one-tailed test allows researchers to double their chances of finding statistically significant results.
- The 2004 voter identification laws of certain states were misclassified. For example, Arizona and Illinois were incorrectly classified as requiring voters to provide identification and state their name for authentication, respectively. However, in 2004 Arizona only required voters at polling stations to sign their name for authentication, while Illinois required poll workers to match the signatures of voters.
- Some of the variables used to predict the decision to vote were used inappropriately. For example, the Eagleton Institute study used the November 2004 CPS family income variable, which is an ordinal variable of unequal income ranges, as an interval-ratio variable. Using categorical variables as interval-ratio variables can lead to estimation problems.

After addressing these issues, our reanalysis finds that some of the original findings of the Eagleton Institute study are unfounded. Controlling for factors that influence voter turnout, voter identification laws largely do not have the negative impact on voter turnout that the Eagleton Institute suggests. When statistically significant and negative relation-

- 6. Timothy Vercellotti and David Anderson, "Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It? The Effects of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout," American Political Science Association conference paper, Philadelphia, Pa., August 31–September 3, 2006, and John R. Lott, Jr., "Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud Have on Voter Participation Rates," Department of Economics, SUNY Binghamton, August 18, 2006.
- 7. Report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, and Moritz College of Law, Ohio State university, June 28, 2006.
- 8. Timothy Vercellotti, "Appendix C: Analysis of Effects of Voter ID Requirements on Turnout," in Report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
- 9. Vercellotti and Anderson, "Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It?"
- 10. Ibid.
- 11. Christopher Drew, "Lower Voter Turnout Is Seen in State that Require ID," *The New York Times*, February 21, 2007, p. A16; Richard Wolf, "Study: Stricter Voting ID Rules Hurt '04 Turnout," *USA Today*, February 19, 2007, p. A5; Matthew Murray, "EAC Blasted Again for Burying Study," *Roll Call*, April 9, 2007; Tom Baxter and Jim Galloway, "Wonk Alert: Study Says the Heavier the Voter ID Requirements, the Lower the Turnout," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, February 21, 2007, Metro News.
- 12. Current Population Survey, November 2004: Voting and Registration Supplement, machine-readable data file, conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005.

TX_00001789 JA 004548 ships are found, the effects are so small that the findings offer little policy significance. For example, our analysis indicates that:

- White survey respondents in photo identification states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than white respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.
- African–American respondents in non-photo identification states are 0.012 percent less likely to report voting than African–American respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.

In other cases, no effect was found.

- In general, respondents in photo identification and non-photo identification states are *just as likely* to report voting compared to respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.
- African–American respondents in photo identification states are *just as likely* to report voting compared to African–American respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.
- Hispanic respondents in photo identification states are *just as likely* to report voting compared to Hispanic respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.

BACKGROUND

When discussing voting behavior, it is important to consider the factors that influence whether an individual votes or not. According to the "Calculus of Voting" model, an individual will vote when the rewards from voting are positive and will abstain when they are not. The equation for the Calculus of Voting model is as follows:

$$R = PB - C + D$$
.

The rewards (R) from voting are determined by multiplying the benefits (B) an individual receives when his preferred candidate wins over a less preferred candidate by the probability (P) that his vote will make a difference plus the benefits one receives from voting as an act of fulfilling one's duty or civic obligation (D) minus the costs of voting (C). ¹³ This is the standard, rational model of voting and will be used to inform the following discussion of voter identification requirements and their effect on voter turnout.

The voter identification issue is often framed as being torn between the opposing aims of "access and integrity." By this we mean that it is commonly perceived that while voter identification laws may be effective at preventing ineligible individuals from voting (integrity), they may have an adverse effect on the ability of every eligible voter to vote (access). There have been only a few empirical studies on the impact of voter identification requirements, but this does not translate into a lack of opinions on this topic.

Advocates for more stringent voter identification laws contend that this reform is vital to prevent voter fraud. 16 As more and more elections are won by slim margins, proponents of identification requirements argue that the chances are greater that voter fraud could affect election outcomes. 17 The potential for a small number of voters to have a significant impact on the outcome of an election became all too evident in the 2000 presidential election. Given that George W. Bush was declared the winner in Florida (and the next President) by a margin of 537 votes, it follows that even a small number of fraudulent votes (537+1) would matter a great deal. 18 In 2004, there were allegations of voter fraud in the Washington gubernatorial election in which Christine Gregoire won by a margin of 129

- 13. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (March, 1968), pp. 25–42.
- 14. Spencer Overton, "Voter Identification," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 631 (February 2007), p. 636.
- 15. Lott, "Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud Have on Voter Participation Rates," and Vercellotti and Anderson, "Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It?"
- 16. Protect Arizona Now, "Background Information."
- 17. Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, September 2005, p. 18, at www.american.edu/iacfer/report/full_report.pdf (July 24, 2007). Additionally, John Fund writes that "Election fraud...can be found in every part of the United States, although it is probably spreading because of the ever-so-tight divisions that have polarized the country and created so many close elections lately." Fund, Stealing Elections, p. 5.
- 18. M.V. Hood III and Charles S. Bullock, "Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Georgia's Voter Identification Statute," April 2007, p.1, at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/GA%20Voter%20ID%20(Bullock%20&%20Hood).pdf (July 24, 2007).

тх_0031790 JA_004549 votes. 19 Certainly the potential of voter fraud is a matter of concern.

Broadly defined, voter fraud is "the intentional corruption of the electoral process by voters." While voter fraud manifests itself in different forms, examples include individuals who vote but are ineligible (such as non-citizens and felons), individuals who vote multiple times in various precincts, and individuals who vote using someone else's name. Because of the lack of research and the difficulty of collecting data on voter fraud, the extent to which these kinds of voter fraud occur is unknown. Additionally, for similar reasons, we are unaware of the extent to which voter identification laws would curb the type of voter fraud they are intended to prevent.

However, there are some examples of recorded voter fraud. The Department of Justice asserts that since the inception of the Attorney General's Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative in 2002, 120 people have been charged with election fraud, of which 86 have been convicted. Additionally, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reports that prosecutors in Milwaukee filed charges against 14 individuals for voter fraud in the 2004 election. Of the 14, 10 were felons accused of voting and four were accused of double voting. Prosecutors obtained five convictions. For proponents of strict voter identification requirements, the knowledge that any voter fraud

occurs is sufficient to argue that more needs to be done to curb this problem.²³

The most prevalent critique of the voter fraud argument is that "voter-fraud anecdotes are often misleading, incomplete, and unrepresentative." Proponents of this view contend that upon closer examination of claims of voter fraud, such charges turn out to be either nonexistent or infrequent. For instance, the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law found that in 2004, voter fraud occurred 0.0009 percent of the time in the gubernatorial election in Washington and 0.00004 percent of the time in Ohio. They report that these percentages are akin to the likelihood of an American's being killed by lightning. ²⁵

Opponents of voter identification requirements also argue that the few instances of voter fraud that may be prevented by identification laws do not outweigh the thousands of legitimate voters who would be disenfranchised because they lacked the necessary identification.²⁶ These critics argue that identification laws will have a negative impact on the ability of certain minorities, the elderly, the disabled, and the poor to vote.²⁷ It is presumed, and some studies have found, that people from these groups are less likely to possess drivers' licenses or other government-issued identification.²⁸ It is also assumed that many from these groups would be unable or unwilling acquire the necessary docu-

- 19. Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, p. 4.
- 20. Lorraine Minnite, "The Politics of Voter Fraud," Project Vote, p. 6, at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/ Politics_of_Voter_Fraud_Final.pdf (July 24, 2007).
- 21. U.S. Department of Justice, "Fact Sheet: Protecting Voting Rights and Prosecuting Voter Fraud," press release, October 31, 2006, at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/November/06_crt_738.html (July 23, 2007).
- 22. Bill Glauber, "Her first vote put her in prison; Woman is one of five from city convicted of voter fraud," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, May 21, 2007, p. A1.
- 23. Overton, "Voter Identification," p. 648.
- 24. Ibid., p. 644.
- 25. Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, "The Truth About 'Voter Fraud," September 2006, p. 1, at www.brennancenter.org/ dynamic/subpages/download_file_38347.pdf (July 24, 2007).
- 26. Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Spencer Overton, "Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform," September 19, 2005, p. 2, at www.carterbakerdissent.com/final_carterbaker_rebuttal092005.pdf (July 24, 2007).
- 27. Ibid., p. 3.
- 28. See John Pawasarat, "The Driver License Status of the Voting Age Population in Wisconsin," June 2005, at www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETI/barriers/DriversLicense.pdf (July 24, 2007); Hood and Bullock, "Worth a Thousand Words?"; and Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, "Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans' Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification," November 2006, at www.federalelectionreform.com/pdf/Citizens%20Without%20Proof.pdf (July 25, 2007).

тх_0**%**001791 **JA_004**550 mentation. Critics of strict identification laws further argue that the costs (in both time and money) of obtaining such documentation would be a deterrent to voting and would likely result in lower voter turnout among poor voters and those who do not have easy access to government offices.²⁹ It is for this reason that "ID requirements are compared to modern poll taxes."³⁰

While it is difficult to accurately assess the number of eligible voters who would be rendered unable to vote because they lack proper identification, some studies have attempted to estimate such figures by looking at the percentage of the population who do not have driver's licenses. For instance, a Wisconsin study found that when considering the entire state, 80 percent of men and 81 percent of women had valid driver's licenses. In contrast, only 45 percent of African-American men and 51 percent of African-American women had valid driver's licenses. The percentages for Latinos were also lower (54 percent for men and 41 percent for women).31 Similarly, a Georgia study found that among registered voters, non-whites, women, and the elderly were less likely to have governmentissued photo identification (either a driver's license or state identification).³²

Although these figures shed light on the types of people who are less likely to have driver's licenses, it is unadvisable to focus on this statistic alone. First, the data still cannot tell us whether those individuals without driver's licenses have some other form of identification, such as an employee ID, student ID, social security card, or any other form of identification currently accepted in many states. Second, it cannot tell us about future behavior. Do voters in photo identification states who lack the necessary identification obtain the required identification (such as a driver's license) when the state law is

changed? Take for instance the previous study conducted in Wisconsin, which currently does not require identification before voting (except for those requirements set forth in HAVA for new voters). Although approximately half of African-Americans in the state are currently without driver's licenses, we do not know if those individuals will get driver's licenses or state IDs if Wisconsin were to require voters to show identification before voting.

For these reasons, proponents of voter identification requirements are convinced that requiring identification at the polls would not be an excessive burden to voters. As previously mentioned, identification is required for many things that are considerably less important than voting (flying in a plane, buying alcohol, etc.). As "voting is equally important," if not more important, the argument goes that it makes sense for someone to be required to show identification in order to cast a ballot. 33 Additionally, Senior Research Scientist John Lott at the University of Maryland Foundation points out that as "almost 100 countries require photo identifications to vote," the United States would be hardly alone in requiring voters to show some form of identification at the polls.³⁴

Those who oppose voter identification at the polls argue that other reforms are better suited to preventing voter fraud. For instance, critics of voter identification point to absentee ballots as "the Achilles heel of election security" because voters are often not required to show identification at all.³⁵ Yet absentee ballots have been largely left out of the voter identification requirement debate. This apparent discrepancy has been used by opponents of voter identification laws as evidence that supporters of such legislation are not interested in real voter fraud reform.³⁶ Rather, critics argue that voter identification supporters are using such laws

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^{29.} Task Force on the Federal Election System, John Mark Hansen, "Chapter 6: Verification of Identity," July 2001, p. 4, at www.tcf.org/Publications/ ElectionReform/NCFER/hansen_chap6_verification.pdf (July 24, 2007).

^{30.} Timothy Ryan, "Voter ID Laws Need Measured Implementation," AEI–Brookings Election Reform Project Newsletter, April 17, 2007, at www.reformelections.org/commentary.asp?opedid=1555 (July 24, 2007).

^{31.} Pawasarat, "The Driver License Status of the Voting Age Population in Wisconsin," p. 3.

^{32.} Hood and Bullock, "Worth a Thousand Words?" p. 14.

^{33.} Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, p. 18.

^{34.} Lott, "Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud Have on Voter Participation Rates," p. 2.

^{35.} Ryan, "Voter ID Laws Need Measured Implementation."

^{36.} Editorial, "Voter Suppression in Missouri," *The New York Times*, August 10, 2006, p. 22, and Lott, "Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud Have on Voter Participation Rates," p. 6.

as an attempt to suppress voter turnout by increasing the costs of voting (the "C" from the Calculus of Voting model).³⁷

Another argument proffered by supporters of voter identification requirements is that such laws are necessary to maintain the public's faith in the integrity of elections. The Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter-Baker Commission) at American University asserts that "the electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters." This argument, "the ensuring integrity hypothesis," contends that public faith in the honesty of elections actually "encourages additional voter participation." Proponents argue that voter identification laws will bolster the public's faith in the outcome of elections. This will increase, not decrease, turnout because voters will feel a greater pride in voting (increasing the "D" or duty component of voting).

Voter identification laws are exceptionally popular among the general public. In a survey of some 36,000 voters, Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and Elting R. Morison of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that 77 percent of respondents supported voter identification requirements. For the most part, the majority of respondents supported such laws regardless of race, location (Northeast, Midwest, etc.), and political ideology. While those who identified themselves as conservatives had the highest percentage of agreement with identification requirements (at 95 percent), even those who identified themselves as "very liberal" had 50 percent agreement with voter identification laws. Regarding race, more than 70 percent of whites,

African-Americans, and Hispanics supported voter identification laws. 42 Additionally, Ansolabehere found only 23 instances out of 36,000 where an individual reported being unable to vote because he lacked the necessary identification. 43

These survey data are supported by actual voter behavior. In 2004, when Arizonans voted on Proposition 200, which would require voter identification at the polls as evidence of citizenship, it passed with 56 percent of the vote.⁴⁴

Ultimately, it is not the intent of this paper to debate the merits of either side's arguments. Rather, we want to present the major arguments on either side of this issue as background to our analysis. However, the paper does intend to examine more closely one of the claims of this debate: that stricter voter identification requirements depress voter turnout. In order to do that, it is necessary to discuss the different voter identification requirements across the 50 states and the District of Columbia.

Voter identification requirements, if any, differ by state, so there is great variability in the way voters from different parts of the country are required to verify their identity before casting a ballot. Some states rely on the honor system where voters merely have to give their names to the election official. Other states only require a signature, 46 with some states going a step further and actually matching the signature to a previously signed document. States with more stringent requirements ask that voters provide identification 48 or photo identification.

The Eagleton Institute study identified two categories of identification requirements (maximum

- 37. Editorial, "Voter Suppression in Missouri."
- 38. Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, p. 18.
- 39. Lott, "Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud Have on Voter Participation Rates," p. 4.
- 40. Stephen Ansolabehere and Elting R. Morison, "Access Versus Integrity in Voter Identification Requirements," Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 2007, at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/material/NYU_Identification1.pdf (July 24, 2007).
- 41. Ibid., p. 4.
- 42. Ibid., p. 5.
- 43. Ibid., p. 7.
- 44. Election returns obtained from Arizona Secretary of State's Web site at www.azsos.gov/election/2004/General/Canvass2004General.pdf.
- 45. As of 2004, such states included Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, among others.
- 46. For instance, California, the District of Columbia, and Michigan were all "sign name" states in 2004.
- 47. Nevada, Oregon, and Pennsylvania were all "signature match" states in 2004.

TX_0601793 JA_004552 requested and minimum required) and five types of identification requirements (stating name, signing name, signature match, present ID, and photo ID). It is important to note that in 2004, there were no states that had photo ID as a minimum requirement. All states that had a photo ID requirement permitted voters who did not have such documentation to present alternative forms of ID or sign an affidavit attesting to their identity. ⁵¹

By the maximum requested, the Eagleton Institute study refers to the most identification that an individual can be asked to present in order to vote using a regular ballot. Conversely, the minimum is the least identification that will be accepted to vote. For example, when voting in Louisiana in 2004, a voter would be asked by poll workers to present photo identification. If the individual was unable to present an acceptable form of ID, he was allowed to vote after signing an affidavit stating he is the person he claims to be. In that case, photo ID would be the maximum requested, and affidavit would be the minimum required.

Within the states that require some form of documentation as proof of identity, there are also significant differences. For instance, some states, like Massachusetts, "may" ask that a voter show identification, but identification is not automatically requested of all voters. ⁵⁴ In Alabama and Alaska, two states that request identification, this requirement can be waived if a poll worker knows the voter and can attest to his identity. ⁵⁵ This is an important issue to consider because it means that different voters within the same state may be affected by different identification requirements.

Furthermore, by the 2004 election, many states had become compliant with certain provisions in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) which required identification at the polls from first-time voters who registered by mail and who did not show identification at the time of registration. One state, Pennsylvania, actually went above and beyond HAVA requirements and mandated that all first-time voters needed to show identification at the polls regardless of whether they showed identification when they registered to vote. ⁵⁶ Because of HAVA, many first-time voters had to show identification at the polls even in states that did not otherwise require identification from all voters.

Even among states that require documentation, there is great variability in the types of documentation that is accepted. Some accept only a government-issued photo identification, while others accept almost any document that demonstrates a person's identity. For example, in 2004, acceptable documentation in Florida ranged from a driver's license and passport to credit card and buyer's club card to utility bill, bank statement, or paycheck (as long as they contained the name and address of the individual).⁵⁷ In contrast, some states that required identification to vote are much more restrictive with respect to acceptable forms of identification. One such state, Virginia, only allowed voters to present a voter registration card, Social Security card, employer-issued identification card (as long as it contained a photo), Virginia driver's license, or other Commonwealth or government-issued identification. 58 Furthermore, in many states, individuals who are unable to provide the appropriate documentation are given an alternative, such as signing

- 51. Ibid, p. 9.
- 52. Ibid.
- 53. La. R.S. 18:562.
- 54. 950 C.M.R. § 53.03(5B); 950 C.M.R. § 54.04(6B).
- 55. Ala. Code § 17-9-30; Alaska Statute § 15.15.225.
- 56. Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 25 § 3050.
- 57. West's Fla. Stat. Ann § 101.043.
- 58. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-643.

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^{48.} Alabama, Alaska, and Connecticut are just a few of the states that required voters to show some form of identification at the polls in 2004.

^{49.} Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, South Carolina, and South Dakota were all of the states requiring photo ID during the 2004 election.

^{50.} Report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002, p. 8.

an affidavit, in order to vote. Finally, Section 302 of HAVA requires that an individual who fails to meet the identification requirements of voting can still vote using a provisional ballot.⁵⁹

The key aspects of this brief overview of identification requirements of voting is that there is a lot of variability by states as to what is required, and not all identification requirements are created equal. By that we mean that required identification documentation for one state may not meet the identity requirements in another state. This is just one of the reasons that it is particularly difficult to study the effect of such laws on voter turnout.

THE DATA

In order to analyze individual voter turnout, this study uses data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, November 2004: Voting and Registration Supplement File. ⁶⁰ The November 2004 CPS voting supplement contains interviews from about 57,000 households. Based on self-described registered voters, the data allow us to model the decision to vote based on individual and household characteristics.

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is whether or not the respondent reported that he or she voted in the November 2004 election. Respondents who admitted to not being registered voters were omitted, along with those reporting that they were not United States citizens. We also omitted those reported to be voting through absentee ballots. ⁶¹

According to the U.S. Census Bureau's analysis of the November 2004 CPS data, 89 percent of registered voters voted in the November 2004 election. This estimate is drawn from a sample of respondents reporting to be registered voters and is much higher than estimates based on samples of the voting-age population. However, the EAC estimates that 70.4 percent of registered voters turned out to vote. The CPS estimate of 89 percent may be biased upward because it is based on the reported vote, which may be overstated because survey respondents may be disinclined to admit that they did not vote. When turnout is based on the total population over 18 years old, 55.8 percent of persons over age 18 voted. The control of the control

Voter Identification Requirements. The voter identification requirements included in the analysis capture the degree to which a registered voter has to prove his or her identity at the polling station. Two sets of five dichotomous voter identification variables are used in the analysis. The first set is based on the maximum amount of identification that the voter is required to produce in order to prove his or her identity. The maximum state voter identification requirements are broken down into the following classification: state name, sign name, match signature, provide non-photo identification, and provide photo identification. Table 1 presents the voter identification classifications by state used by the Eagleton Institute and the Moritz College of Law at Ohio State University.

For all but two of the states, Illinois and Arizona, we used the classifications that were provided to us by the Eagleton Institute. We recoded these two states because upon researching state election laws, we discovered that the Eagleton Institute had erroneously reported the identification requirements for these two states. The Eagleton Institute study has Illinois listed as a "state name" state. In actuality, Illinois poll workers match a prospective voter's signature to a signature already on file, making Illinois a "match signature" state. 66

The Eagleton Institute has Arizona listed as a "provide ID" state although Arizona was a "sign

- 59. Public Law 107-252.
- 60. Current Population Survey, November 2004: Voting and Registration Supplement.
- 61. To account for Oregon's elections that are conducted entirely through mail, Oregon voters are treated in this analysis as if they vote in person in the polling both. Oregon is classified as a signature match state for voter identification purposes.
- 62. U.S. Census Bureau, "U.S. Voter Turnout Up in 2004, Census Bureau Reports," press release, May 26, 2004, at www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/voting/004986.html (July 2, 2007).
- 63. Kimball W. Brace and Michael P. McDonald, Final Report of the 2004 Election Day Survey, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, September 27, 2005, at www.eac.gov/election_survey_2004/pdf/EDS-Full_Report_wTables.pdf (July 5, 2007).
- 64. William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, 11th edition (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).
- 65. Brace and McDonald, Final Report of the 2004 Election Day Survey.

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Maximum and Minimum Voter Identification Requirements, November 2004 Election

Table I

State	Eagelton Institute Maximum Requirement	Corrected Maximum Requirement	Eagelton Institute Minimum Requirement
Alabama	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID
Alaska	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID
Arizona	Provide non-photo ID	Sign name	Provide non-photo ID
Arkansas	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	State name
California	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Colorado	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID
Connecticut	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID
Delaware	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	State name
District of Columbia	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Florida	Provide photo ID	Provide photo ID	Swear affidavit
	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo IC
Georgia Hawaii	Provide photo ID	Provide photo ID	Provide non-photo IC
nawaii Idaho			
	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Illinois	State name	Match signature	State name
ndiana	Sign name	Sign name	Swear affidavit
owa	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Kansas	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Kentucky	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo IE
Louisiana	Provide photo ID	Provide photo ID	Swear affidavit
Maine	State name	State name	State name
Maryland	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Massachusetts	State name	State name	State name
Michigan	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Minnesota	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Mississippi	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Missouri	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID
Montana	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo IC
Nebraska	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Nevada	Match signature	Match signature	Match signature
New Hampshire	State name	State name	State name
New Jersey	Match signature	Match signature	Match signature
New Mexico	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
New York	Match signature	Match signature	Sign name
North Carolina	State name	State name	State name
North Dakota	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Swear affidavit
Ohio	Match signature	Match signature	Match signature
Oklahoma	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
Oregon	Match signature	Match signature	Match signature
Pennsylvania	Match signature	Match signature	Match signature
Rhode Island	State name	State name	State name
South Carolina	Provide photo ID	Provide photo ID	Provide non-photo IE
South Carolina South Dakota	Provide photo ID	Provide photo ID	Provide non-photo ID
Tennessee	Provide non-photo ID	Provide pnoto ID	Match signature
	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo IC
Texas Utah	State name	State name	State name
		State name	State name
Vermont	State name		
Virginia	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo ID	Provide non-photo IE
Washington	Sign name	Sign name	Sign name
West Virginia	Match signature	Match signature	Sign name
Wisconsin	State name	State name	State name
Wyoming	State name	State name	State name

Sources: Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers; State University of New Jersey; and Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University, Report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act Of 2002, June 28, 2006, at www.eac.gov/docs/Voter/DReport%20062806.pdf (July 30, 2007), and author's personal communication with Timothy Vercellotti (June 1, 2001).

TX_**9**0001796 **JA_004**555 name" state at the time of the 2004 election. ⁶⁷ Identification laws did not go into effect in Arizona until some time after the 2004 election. Arizona could not have been a "provide ID" state before the November 2004 election because Arizonans voted on and approved Proposition 200 on the November 2004 ballot. This initiative is the impetus for the requirement that voters show identification before voting as proof of citizenship. ⁶⁸

The second set of voter identification variables recognizes that some states allow voters without proper identification to vote after demonstrating their identity through other means. This minimum requirement set of variables includes state name, sign name, match signature, provide non-photo identification, and swear affidavit. For the probit regressions, the variable for voters stating their names for identification is omitted for reference purposes.

Individual Factors. The individual factors included in the analysis capture differences in the race and ethnicity, age, education, household income, marital status, gender, employment status, citizenship, residential mobility, and home ownership of the individual respondents. Controlling for such variables as education and age is important because research indicates that these variables are good predictors of voting turnout.⁶⁹ The analysis controls for the effect of the individual's race and ethnicity through a set of mutually exclusive dichotomous variables for the following categories: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic African-American, Hispanic, non-Hispanic American Indians, non-Hispanic Asians (including Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders), and other races, including those reporting multiple races and ethnicities. The specification

of these variables allows us to compare the voting patterns of minorities to those of whites.

A set of dichotomous variables control for the age of the individual respondents that fall into the following categories: 18- to 24-year-olds, 25- to 44-year-olds, 45- to 64-year-olds, and 65 years and older. For education, the respondents were classified as either having less than a high school diploma, high school diploma or equivalent, some college, bachelor's degree, or a graduate school degree.

For family income, the Eagleton Institute study used an ordinal family income variable as an interval-ratio variable. The family income variable is coded as 1 through 16 with units containing unequal income ranges. For the purposes of this analysis, the effect of family income is controlled for by the inclusion of a series of income range dichotomous variables: under \$15,000, \$15,000 to \$29,999, \$30,000 to \$49,999, \$50,000 to \$74,999, \$75,000 to \$149,999, and \$150,000 or more.

To control for the influence of marital status, five dichotomous variables signifying being single, married, separated, divorced, and widowed are included in the model. Single individuals are the default. A dichotomous variable identifying the gender of the individual as a female is also included in the models.

Two dichotomous variables are included to control for the effect of employment. The first is a dichotomous variable signifying whether or not the individual is employed; the second is a dichotomous variable for whether or not the person is in the labor force.

To control for whether native-born citizens are more likely to vote than naturalized citizens, a dichotomous variable identifying native-born citi-

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^{66.} Documentation supporting the signature match requirement can be found at the following: ILCS 5/6-66; electionline.org, Election Reform Briefing, April, 2002, p. 12, at www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ Voter%20Identification.pdf; Punchcard Manual of Instructions for Illinois Election Judges, 2005, at www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/ ElectionInformation/ PDF/03selfsec.pdf; and Election Law @ Moritz, 50 Questions for 5 States, Illinois, last updated 1/19/07, at moritzlaw.osu.edu/ electionlaw/election06/50-5_Illinois.php#14.

^{67.} Arizona Secretary of State, 2004 Ballot Propositions, "Instructions to Voters and Election Officers," September, 2004, at www.azsos.gov/election/2004/Info/PubPamphlet/Sun_Sounds/english/contents.htm.

^{68.} The text of Proposition 200 is available at www.pan2004.com/docs/initiative_petition.pdf.

^{69.} Flanigan and Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate.

^{70.} The variable "HUFAMINC" in the November 2005 CPS has the following coding: 1 for less than \$5,000; 2 for \$5,000 to \$7,499; 3 for \$7,500 to \$9,999; 4 for \$10,000 to \$12,499; 5 for \$12,500 to \$14,999; 6 for \$15,000 to \$19,000; 7 for \$20,000 to \$24,999; 8 for \$25,000 to \$29,999; 9 for \$30,000 to \$34,999; 10 for \$35,000 to \$39,999; 11 for \$40,000 to \$49,999; 12 for \$50,000 to \$59,999; 13 for \$60,000 to \$74,999; 14 for \$75,000 to \$99,999; 15 for \$100,000 to \$149,999; and 16 for \$150,000 or more.

zens is included. Two dichotomous variables are included to control for community ties. The models control for whether or not the individual has moved within the last year and whether or not the individual owns or rents his or her home. These two variables are included to help control for social connectedness under the theory that those with stronger community ties will be more likely to vote.

State Political Factors. As with the Eagleton Institute study, two dichotomous variables indicate whether a state is considered a battleground state and a competitive state. A state is designated as a battleground state if the margin of victory for the winning 2004 presidential candidate was 5 percent or less. A state was designated as competitive if the margin of victory for governor and/or U.S. Senate races was 5 percent or less.

FINDINGS

The probit regression analyses that follow examine the effects of voter identification requirements on voter turnout. Table 2 presents the original findings of the Eagleton Institute's probit regression analysis. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics

of the data used in Table 4. Based on our analyses, six sets of probit regression models are presented in Tables 4 to 9.

The first set of probit regressions contains our replication of the Eagleton Institute study for their analysis of all voters (Table 4). The second set of probit regressions presents the findings for all voters under a different model specification and the corrected classification of state identification requirements for Arizona and Illinois (Table 5). The sixth through ninth sets of probit regressions present our findings for the different model specification and corrected coding for state identification requirements for whites, African—Americans, Hispanics, and Asians (Tables 6 through 9).

For all of the models, robust standard errors are estimated to correct for correlated error terms within each state. For tests of statistical significance, the standard two-tailed tests are used. See below for a discussion of one-tailed versus two-tailed tests of statistical significance. The calculations in Tables 3 through 9 use the CPS weight, PWSSWGT, as recommended by the Bureau of the Census.


ONE-TAILED VERSUS TWO-TAILED TESTS OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

When doing tests of statistical significance for hypotheses, social scientists generally use twotailed tests. Two-tailed tests are used to check for a difference while ignoring in which direction the difference lies.

For example, a social scientist would use a twotailed test to determine whether voters in photo identification and give name states have different probabilities of reporting having voted in the 2004 election, regardless of the direction of the relationship. By using a two-tailed test, the 5 percent probability is split between both ends of the bell-shaped curve. (See Figure A in Chart 1.) That is, 2.5 percent of the probability that the difference is due to chance is placed in the side that represents respondents in photo identification states being less likely to vote, while 2.5 percent is placed in the side that represents respondents in photo identification states being more likely to vote. If the probit coefficient for photo identification states falls within either of the 2.5 percent shaded regions, this finding is determined to be statistically significant. If the coefficient falls within the left (right) tail, photo identification requirements have a negative (positive) relationship with reported voter turnout. If the coefficient falls between the 2.5 percent shaded regions, photo identification requirements are said have no relationship with voter turnout.

When one-tailed tests are used, social scientists are hypothesizing that the relationship between photo identification requirements and reported voting has a specific direction: for example, voter identification requirements decrease (increase) reported voting. As determined by the social scientist, all of the 5 percent of chance is placed in one end of the bell-shaped curve. If the direction of the relationship is as hypothesized, placing the entire 5 percent chance in one side makes it is twice as easy to achieve a statistically significant finding with a one-tailed test as with a two-tailed test. Figure B in Chart 1 is an example of a one-tailed test where the researcher believes a negative relationship exists. In the case of photo identification requirements and voter turnout, if the coefficient falls within the 5 percent shaded region of the left tail, photo identification requirements would then be said to have a negative relationship. If the coefficient does not fall within the 5 percent region, then photo identifica-

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tion requirements are said to have no relationship with voter turnout.

According to norms of the social sciences, researchers generally use two-tailed tests. When they deviate from this norm, social scientists gen-

erally provide a justification for why they have done so. Consumers of statistical research should be skeptical of findings based on one-tailed tests, especially when such findings do not hold up under two-tailed testing.

Replicating the Eagleton Institute's Findings for All Voters

Table 2 contains the findings from the Eagleton Institute's probit regression for all registered voters as presented in their paper. Table 3 presents the findings from our attempt to replicate the Eagleton Institute study findings for all voters. In our attempt at replicating the Eagleton Institute's study, we could not entirely match the same number of respondents. The Eagleton Institute's probit regression of all voters is based on 54,973 respondents. Our best attempt at replicating their analysis produced 54,829 respondents—144 fewer respondents. In addition, the results reported in Table 3 use the more commonly accepted two-tailed significance tests.

While the Eagleton Institute reported that states with sign name, non-photo identification, and photo identification requirements have lower voter turnout than states with only the state name requirement, only the photo identification coefficient in our attempt at replication (Model 1) is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence

level. Respondents from photo identification states are less likely to have reported voting compared to respondents in states that only required voters to say their names at the polling stations. The magnitude of the negative relationship between photo identification requirements and voter turnout is difficult to interpret with probit coefficients, so the elasticity was calculated. The elasticity figures used in this analysis represent the percentage change in the probability of reporting to vote given a one-unit change in a particular dichotomous independent variable. The survey respondents in photo identification states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than respondents from states that only required voters to give their name for identification.

Model 2 corrects for the Eagleton Institute study's misclassification of the voter identification requirements in Arizona and Illinois. With the correction, all of the state voter identification variables are statistically insignificant—meaning that none of these requirements has a statistically measurable relationship with voting turnout.

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^{71.} Vercellotti and Anderson, "Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It?" Table 3, p. 23.

Model 3 attempts to replicate the findings of the Eagleton Institute's examination of the effect of minimum requirements. As seen in Table 2, the Eagleton Institute found that the coefficients for sign name, non-photo identification, and swear affidavit states had statistically significant, negative relationships with voter turnout using one-tailed significant tests. However, our analysis presented in Model 3 using two-tailed statistical significance tests finds only the swear affidavit coefficient to be statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The survey respondents in swear affidavit states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than respondents from states that only required voters to state their name for identification.

It should be noted that although we ran the minimum identification requirement model using the classifications assigned to the states by the Eagleton Institute study, there are some issues with the states considered to have an affidavit as the minimum requirement. These issues should be addressed in follow-up studies. First, the Eagleton Institute study identified only four states as having a minimum requirement of sign affidavit. They are Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and North Dakota. All but one of these

states, Indiana, require some form of identification as the maximum requested. This puts Indiana in the precarious position of requiring, at a maximum, that a voter sign his name before receiving a ballot; if he is unable to do so, he can sign an affidavit and vote. This does not make sense, because Indiana in 2004 did not require identification before voting (other than for those affected by HAVA requirements).

We believe this to be another classification error on the part of the Eagleton Institute. According to the "2004 Indiana Election Day Handbook," the

Copies	of Eag	leton	Institute	's
Probit I	Models	of Vot	ter Turno	ut

	Maximum Requirement		Minimum R	.equirement
Variable	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.
Sign name	-0.11*	0.05	-0.08*	0.04
Match signature	-0.04	0.05	-0.03	0.05
Non-photo ID	-0.16**	0.06	-0.15**	0.05
Photo ID	-0.17**	0.07		
Affidavit			-0.23**	0.06
Hispanic	-0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.05
African-American	0.24**	0.04	0.24**	0.04
Asian American	-0.37 **	0.07	-0.38**	0.07
Age 25–44	0.004	0.02	0.003	0.02
Age 45–64	0.26**	0.03	0.26**	0.03
Age 65+	0.43**	0.03	0.43**	0.03
High school	0.31**	0.02	0.31**	0.02
Some college	0.57**	0.03	0.57**	0.03
College	0.88**	0.04	0.88**	0.04
Graduate school	0.98**	0.05	0.98**	0.05
Household income	0.03**	0.003	0.03**	0.003
Married	0.23**	0.02	0.23**	0.02
Female	0.10**	0.01	0.10**	0.01
Battleground state	0.17**	0.04	0.18**	0.04
Competitive race	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05
Employed	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Member of workforce	-0.05	0.05	-0.05	0.05
Native-born citizen	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04
Moved within past 6 months	-0.29**	0.03	-0.29**	0.03
Constant	-0.09	0.10	-0.09	0.09
Pseudo R-squared	0.09		0.10	
N	54,973		54,973	

^{*} p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Note: One-tailed significance tests were used.

Source: Timothy Vercellotti and David Anderson, "Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It? The Effects of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout," American Political Science Association conference paper, Philadelphia, Pa., August 31-September 3, 2006, p. 23, Table 3.

> procedure for signing an affidavit only applies to challenged voters who are then given a provisional ballot if they sign the affidavit. 72 This voting method would not fall under the guidelines set forth by the Eagleton Institute because it applies to provisional, and not regular, ballots.⁷³ For these reasons, we believe Indiana should have a minimum identification requirement of sign name, the same as its maximum.

> Additionally, there are five other states (Connecticut, 74 Delaware, 75 Georgia, 76 South Dakota, 77

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^{72.} Indiana Election Division, "2004 Indiana Election Day Handbook: A Guide for Precinct Election Boards and Poll Workers," December 2003, pp. 13-17.

^{73.} Report to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements Pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002, p. 8.

Replicating Vercellotti: Probit Models of Overall Voter Turnout Based on the Eagleton Institute's Specification

		Maximum F	Minimum Requirement				
	Mod	el I	Mod	lel 2	Mod		
	Replic	Replication		d States	Replication		
Variable	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	
Sign name	-0.08	0.04	-0.06	0.06	-0.03	0.05	
Match signature	-0.01	0.05	0.01	0.06	-0.02	0.07	
Non-photo ID	-0.10	0.06	-0.10	0.07	-0.08	0.06	
Photo ID	-0.10*	0.05	-0.10	0.06			
Affidavit					-0.10*	0.05	
Hispanic	-0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.05	
African-American	0.29***	0.04	0.29***	0.05	0.24**	0.05	
Asian American	-0.45***	0.07	-0.45***	0.08	-0.46**	0.07	
Age 25-44	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.11	0.03	
Age 45-64	0.27***	0.03	0.27***	0.03	0.27***	0.03	
Age 65+	0.44***	0.03	0.44***	0.03	0.45***	0.03	
High school	0.32***	0.03	0.32***	0.25	0.32***	0.03	
Some college	0.611***	0.03	0.61***	0.03	0.61***	0.03	
College	0.90***	0.04	0.90***	0.04	0.90***	0.04	
Graduate school	1.04***	0.05	1.04***	0.05	1.05***	0.05	
Household income	0.04***	0.003	0.04***	0.003	0.04***	0.003	
Married	0.21***	0.03	0.21***	0.03	0.21***	0.03	
Female	0.10***	0.02	0.10***	0.02	0.10***	0.02	
Battleground state	0.20***	0.04	0.20***	0.04	0.21***	0.05	
Competitive race	-0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06	
Employed	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	
Member of workforce	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	
Native-born citizen	-0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.05	
Moved within past 6 months	-0.36***	0.04	-0.36***	0.04	-0.36***	0.04	
Constant	-0.11	0.09	-0.12	0.10	-0.13	0.09	
Pseudo R-squared	0.10		0.10		0.10		
N	54,829		54,829		54,829		

^{*} p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 3

Note: Two-tailed significance tests were used. Robust standard errors adjusted for state clustering are reported. The CPS population weights were used.

Source: Heritage Foundation calculations.

and Virginia⁷⁸) that require some form of identification but make exceptions and allow voters without the required documentation to sign an affidavit in order to vote. To be classified correctly, these states should also be considered to have a minimum requirement of sign affidavit as they too provide opt outs for voters unable to show appropriate forms of identification.

As for the socioeconomic variables in Models 1 through 3, African–Americans are more likely to have reported voting in the election than a grouping of non-Hispanic whites, American Indians, Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders, and others. In contrast, Asians are less likely to report voting. Respondents aged 45 and above are more likely to report voting than those 18 to 24 years old. Those with an

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^{74.} Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-261.

^{75. 15} Del. Code. § 4937.

^{76.} Ga. Code. Ann. § 21-2-417.

^{77.} S.D. Codified Laws § 12-18-6.2.

^{78.} Va. Code. Ann. § 24.2-643.

education at or above a high school diploma are more likely to report voting than those without a high school degree. Family income has a positive relationship with the probability of reporting having voted. Married and female respondents are more likely to report voting than not married and male respondents, respectively. Respondents residing in battleground states are more likely to vote, while respondents who moved within the last six months are less likely to report voting.

Alternative Model Specifications

Concerns regarding some of the variables used in the Eagleton Institute study led us to estimate alternative specifications that use the November 2004 CPS data more appropriately.

First, the Eagleton Institute's race and ethnicity dichotomous variables compare African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians to the default group of whites, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders, and those reporting to be more than one race and/or ethnicity. For example, the Eagleton Institute found that African-Americans were more likely to report voting compared to whites, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Islanders. Hawaiians/Pacific those reporting to be more than one race and/or ethnicity.

The descriptive statistics of the data used for the alternative specifications are presented in Table 4. The analyses in Table 5 control for the

effect of the individual's race and ethnicity through a set of mutually exclusive dichotomous variables for the following categories: non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic African-Americans, Hispanics, non-Hispanic American Indians and Alaskan Natives, non-Hispanic Asians (including Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders), and other races, including those reporting multiple races and ethnicities. For example, this division of race and ethnic groups allows us to present clearer estimates of

Descrip	tive St	atistics		
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Voted	0.87	0.33	0	
Sign name	0.26	0.44	0	i
Match signature	0.17	0.38	0	1
Non-photo ID	0.26	0.44	0	1
Photo ID	0.09	0.28	0	1
Recoded sign name	0.27	0.44	Ō	i
Recoded match signature	0.21	0.41	Ô	i
Recoded non-photo ID	0.25	0.43	Õ	i
Recoded photo ID	0.09	0.28	Ö	i
Hispanic	0.05	0.21	0	i
African–American	0.09	0.29	ő	i
American Indian	0.01	0.09	Ŏ	i
Asian American	0.02	0.14	Ő	i
Other race	0.02	0.12	0	i
Age 25–44	0.37	0.48	0	i
Age 45–64	0.38	0.48	0	i
Age 65+	0.17	0.10	0	i
High school	0.17	0.37	0	,
Some college	0.30	0.46	0	,
College	0.20	0.40	0	,
Graduate school	0.10	0.31	0	ı
Family income, \$15,000–\$29,999	0.15	0.36	0	ı
	0.13	0.38	0	
Family income, \$30,000–\$49,999	0.22	0.42	0	;
Family income, \$50,000–\$74,999	0.22	0.42	0	!
Family income, \$75,000–\$149,999		**	-	1
family income, \$150,000 or more	0.06 0.63	0.24	0	1
Married		0.48	0	1
Widowed	0.06 0.10	0.24	0	1
Divorced		0.30		!
Seperated	0.02	0.13	0	!
Female	0.53	0.50	0	! !
Battleground state	0.28	0.45	0	!
Competitive race	0.19	0.39	0	!
Employed	0.69	0.46	0	!
Member of workforce	0.72	0.45	0	!
Native-born citizen	0.96	0.20	0	!
Moved within last year	0.13	0.33	0	!
Home ownership $N = 54,695$	0.80	0.40	0	ı

how voter identification laws affect the voting probabilities of minorities compared to whites.

Second, the Eagleton Institute study used an ordinal family income variable as an interval-ratio variable. Using categorical variables as interval-ratio variables can lead to estimation problems, so for the purposes of this analysis, the effect of family income is controlled for by the inclusion of a series of income range dichotomous variables.

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Alternative Specifications of Probit Models of Overall Voter Turnout

			Ma	ximum R	equirement				Minim Require	
	Mode	l 4	Mode		Mode	el 6	Mode	<u></u> 1 7	Mode	
	Vercellotti C	ategories	Vercellotti C	ategories	Recoded	States	Recoded	States	Vercellotti C	ategories
Variable	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.
Sign name	-0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.05	-0.06	0.06	-0.06	0.06	-0.03	0.05
Match signature	-0.001	0.06	-0.00003	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.06	-0.01	0.07
Non-photo ID	-0.10	0.06	-0.10	0.06	-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.07	-0.08	0.06
Photo ID	-0.10*	0.05	-0.10	0.05	-0.10	0.06	-0.095	0.06		
Affidavit									-0.10*	0.05
Hispanic	-0.07	0.06	-0.07	0.06	-0.07	0.06	-0.07	0.06	-0.7	0.06
African–American	0.30***	0.05	0.29***	0.05	0.30***	0.05	0.29***	0.05	0.29***	0.05
American Indian	-0.10	0.08	-0.10	0.08	-0.11	0.08	-0.11	0.07	-0.11	0.08
Asian American	-0.43***	0.07	-0.44***	0.07	-0.44***	0.07	-0.44***	0.07	-0.45***	0.07
Other race	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.03	0.06
Age 25–44	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.03
Age 45–64	0.25***	0.03	0.33***	0.04	0.25***	0.03	0.33***	0.04	0.33***	0.04
Age 65+	0.40***	0.03	0.53***	0.04	0.40***	0.03	0.53***	0.04	0.53***	0.04
High school	0.33***	0.03	0.32***	0.03	0.33***	0.03	0.32***	0.03	0.32***	0.03
Some college	0.62***	0.03	0.52	0.03	0.53	0.03	0.52	0.03	0.52	0.03
College	0.82	0.03	0.90***	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.90***	0.03	0.90***	0.03
•	1.05***	0.05	1.04***	0.05	1.05***	0.05	1.04***	0.05	1.04***	0.05
Graduate school Family income,	1.03	0.03	1.04	0.03	1.05	0.03	1.0-1	0.03	1.04	0.03
\$15,000–\$29,999 Family income,	0.17***	0.02	0.16***	0.02	0.17***	0.02	0.16***	0.02	0.16***	0.02
\$30,000–\$49,999 Family income,	0.21***	0.03	0.19***	0.03	0.21***	0.03	0.19***	0.03	0.20***	0.03
\$50,000-\$74,999	0.24***	0.03	0.23***	0.03	0.24***	0.03	0.23***	0.03	0.23***	0.03
Family income, \$75,000–\$149,999	0.39***	0.04	0.38***	0.04	0.39***	0.04	0.38***	0.04	0.39***	0.04
Family income,	0.37***	0.05	0.36***	0.05	0.37***	0.05	0.36***	0.05	0.36***	0.05
\$150,000 or more	0.37***	0.03	0.10**	0.03	0.20***	0.03	0.36**	0.03	0.10**	0.03
Married Midawad			-0.24***	0.04			-0.24***	0.04	-0.25***	0.04
Widowed Divorced			-0.10**	0.04			-0.10**	0.04	-0.11**	0.04
			-0.10 -0.24***	0.04			-0.10	0.04	-0.24***	0.04
Seperated	0.10***	0.02	0.11***	0.04	0.10***	0.02	0.11***	0.04	0.11***	0.04
Female		0.02	0.11***	0.02	0.19***	0.02	0.19***	0.02	0.11***	0.02
Battleground state	0.20***									
Competitive race	-0.03	0.06	-0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.06
Employed	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05
Member of workforce	80.0	0.06	0.07	0.06	80.0	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06
Native-born citizen	-0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.05
Moved within last year	-0.27***	0.03	-0.27***	0.03	-0.27***	0.03	-0.27***	0.03	-0.27***	0.03
Home ownership	0.16***	0.03	0.17***	0.03	0.16***	0.03	0.17***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
Constant	-0.08	0.09	-0.05	0.09	-0.11	0.09	-0.06	0.11	-0.07	0.09
Pseudo R-squared N	0.10 54,695		0.10 54,695		54,695		0.11 54,695		0.10 54,695	

^{*} p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 5

Note: Two-tailed significance tests were used. Robust standard errors adjusted for state clustering are reported. The CPS population weights were used.

Source: Heritage Foundation calculations.

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Third, the effect of photo identification variables on voter turnout is very sensitive to how the models control for marriage. In addition to a dichotomous variable for whether or not the respondent reported being married, additional dichotomous variables were added for those reporting to be widowed, separated, and divorced. This minor change in marital control variables has a significant impact on the results for the relationship between voter turnout and some of the voter identification variables.

Fourth, the alternative models control for whether or not the individual has moved within the last year instead of the six-month time period used by the Eagleton Institute.

Fifth, a variable indicating whether or not the respondent owns or rents his or her home was added to the alternative models. The residential mobility and home ownership variables help to control for how connected the respondents are to their communities.

Table 5 presents the findings of the alternative model specification for all respondents. Model 4 contains the revised race/ethnicity and income variables along with the variables for residential mobility and home ownership. Of the four voter identification variables, only the photo identification variable is statistically significant. Photo identification states have respondents that are less likely to have reported voting compared to respondents in states that only required voters to say their names at the polling stations. However, the difference is very small. The survey respondents in photo identification states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than respondents from states that only required voters to state their name for identification.

A slight change in how marital status is controlled for in Model 5 makes the findings in Model 4 for photo identification requirements disappear. The inclusion of dichotomous variables to identify respondents if they are widowed, divorced, or separated, in addition to being married, significantly changes the results for the photo identification variable. A photo identification requirement no longer has a statistically significant relationship with voter turnout. Thus, the finding that photo identification requirements reduce voter

turnout in Model 4 is not robust to an alternative model specification.

In Models 6 and 7, Arizona and Illinois are reclassified correctly as requiring voters at polling stations to sign their name and match signatures, respectively. As with Model 4, Model 6 uses only a married dichotomous variable to control for marital status. Model 7 includes additional marital status variables as used in Model 5. After correctly designating Arizona and Illinois, the different ways to control for marital status have no effect on the outcomes for the voter identification variables. All of the state voter identification variables are statistically insignificant—meaning that none of these requirements has a statistically measurable relationship with voter turnout.

Model 8 uses the minimum requirements for voter identification as used by the Eagleton Institute. The only voter identification coefficient to be statistically significant is the swear affidavit coefficient. The survey respondents in swear affidavit states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than respondents from states that only require voters to state their name for identification.

As for the socioeconomic variables in Models 4 through 8, the findings are similar to the previous findings. African–Americans are more likely to have reported voting in the election than non-Hispanic whites, while Asians are less likely to report voting. Older respondents and those with higher incomes and more education are more likely to report voting. Widowed, divorced, and separated respondents are less likely to report voting than singles, while married respondents are more likely to report voting. Female respondents are more likely to report voting than male respondents. Respondents residing in battleground states are more likely to vote, while respondents who moved within the last twelve months are less likely to have reported voting.

Findings by Race and Ethnicity

The impact of voter identification requirements on minority voters has received much media attention recently. To analyze the relationship between race and ethnicity and voter identification requirements, Tables 6 through 9 present the findings of the probit analyses.

TX_0**007**1804 **JA_004563**

^{79.} Tom Baxter and Jim Galloway, "Wonk Alert: Study Says the Heavier the Voter ID Requirements, the Lower Turnout"; Wolf, "Study: Stricter Voting ID Rules Hurt '04 Turnout"; and Dave Zweifel, "Voter ID Reducing Minority Turnout," *The Capital Times* (Madison, Wisconsin), February 28, 2007, p. A6.

Alternative Specifications of Probit Models of Voter Turnout of Whites

	Maximum Requirement			Minimum Requirement		
	Mod	el 9	Mode	el 10	Mod	elll
	Vercellotti Ca	Vercellotti Categorizations		d States	Vercellotti Categorizations	
<u>Variable</u>	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E
Sign name	-0.05	0.05	-0.06	0.07	-0.02	0.05
Match signature	0.01	0.06	-0.01	0.07	-0.01	0.08
Non-photo ID	-0.04	0.07	-0.06	0.08	-0.05	0.07
Photo ID	-0.12*	0.05	-0.14*	0.06		
Affidavit					-0.13**	0.04
Age 25–44	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04
Age 45–64	0.34***	0.04	0.34***	0.04	0.34***	0.04
Age 65+	0.54***	0.05	0.54***	0.05	0.54***	0.05
High school	0.38***	0.03	0.38***	0.03	0.38***	0.03
Some college	0.70***	0.03	0.70***	0.03	0.70***	0.03
College	1.00***	0.04	1.00***	0.04	1.00***	0.04
Graduate school	1.13***	0.05	1.13***	0.05	1.13***	0.05
Family income, \$15,000-\$29,999	0.16***	0.04	0.16***	0.04	0.16***	0.03
Family income, \$30,000-\$49,999	0.22***	0.03	0.22***	0.03	0.22***	0.03
Family income, \$50,000-\$74,999	0.24***	0.03	0.24***	0.04	0.24***	0.03
Family income, \$75,000-\$149,999	0.36***	0.05	0.36***	0.05	0.36***	0.05
Family income, \$150,000 or more	0.36***	0.05	0.36***	0.05	0.36***	0.05
Married	0.16**	0.04	0.17***	0.04	0.16**	0.04
Widowed	-0.20***	0.04	-0.20***	0.04	-0.20***	0.04
Divorced	-0.10**	0.04	-0.10**	0.04	-0.10**	0.04
Seperated	-0.33***	0.07	-0.33***	0.07	-0.33***	0.07
Female	0.09***	0.01	0.09***	0.01	0.09***	0.03
Battleground state	0.19***	0.05	0.19***	0.05	0.19***	0.05
Competitive race	-0.04	0.06	-0.04	0.06	-0.04	0.06
Employed	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.06
Member of workforce	-0.001	0.06	-0.001	0.06	0.002	0.06
Native-born citizen	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	-0.09	0.09
Moved within last year	-0.25***	0.03	-0.25***	0.03	-0.25***	0.03
Home ownership '	0.15***	0.03	0.15***	0.03	0.15***	0.03
Constant	-0.05	0.12	-0.05	0.13	-0.26*	0.12
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	<u>-</u>	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.12
N	44,762		44,762		44,762	

^{*} p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 6

Note: Two-tailed significance tests were used. Robust standard errors adjusted for state clustering are reported. The CPS population weights were used. **Source:** Heritage Foundation calculations.

Non-Hispanic Whites. The probit regression results presented in Table 6 contain data for respondents reporting to be non-Hispanic whites. Models 9 and 10 present the findings for the maximum requirements with Model 10 including the correct voter identification classifications for Arizona and Illinois. Except for the photo identification coefficient, none of the coefficients for the voter identification variables are statistically different from zero. In both Models 9 and 10, white respondents in photo identification states are less likely to have reported voting compared to white respondents in states that only required voters to

say their names at the polling stations. Under both models, white survey respondents in photo identification states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than white respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.

The analysis of minimum voter identification requirements in Model 11 finds that white respondents are less likely to vote when the minimum requirement entails a sworn affidavit. White survey respondents in swear affidavit states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than white respondents from states that only required voters to give their name.

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Alternative Specifications of Probit Models of Voter Turnout of African–Americans

	Maximum Requirement				Minimum Requirement		
	Mode	el 12	Mode	el 13	Model 14		
	Vercellotti	Vercellotti Categories		States	Vercellotti	Categories	
Variable	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E	
Sign name	-0.20	0.12	-0.09	0.11	-0.03	0.14	
Match signature	-0.13	0.10	-0.06	0.11	-0.03	0.15	
Non-photo ID	-0.30***	0.09	-0.19*	0.08	-0.12	0.12	
Photo ID	-0.15	0.15	-0.03	0.14			
Affidavit					0.0002	0.21	
Age 25-44	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.10	
Age 45–64	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.11	
Age 65+	0.35*	0.14	0.35*	0.14	0.36*	0.14	
High school	0.30***	0.05	0.30***	0.05	0.30***	0.05	
Some college	0.44***	0.08	0.44***	0.08	0.44***	0.08	
College	0.70***	0.10	0.70***	0.10	0.69***	0.10	
Graduate school	0.88***	0.13	0.89***	0.13	0.86***	0.13	
Family income, \$15,000-\$29,999	0.21**	0.08	0.21**	0.08	0.21**	0.08	
Family income, \$30,000-\$49,999	0.27**	0.08	0.27**	0.08	0.28***	0.08	
Family income, \$50,000-\$74,999	0.39**	0.13	0.38**	0.13	0.39***	0.12	
Family income, \$75,000-\$149,999	0.68***	0.14	0.67***	0.14	0.68***	0.14	
Family income, \$150,000 or more	0.82*	0.32	0.82**	0.32	0.83*	0.32	
Married	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.08	
Widowed	-0.10***	0.11	-0.10***	0.11	-0.10***	0.11	
Divorced	0.13	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.12	0.07	
Seperated	-0.11	0.09	-0.11	0.09	-0.09	0.10	
Female	0.16	0.07	0.16	0.07	0.16	0.07	
Battleground state	0.15	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.13	
Competitive race	-0.01	0.11	0.04	0.11	0.02	0.10	
Employed	-0.10	0.13	-0.11	0.13	-0.10	0.13	
Member of workforce	0.37**	0.13	0.38**	0.13	0.37**	0.13	
Native-born citizen	0.22	0.13	0.25	0.13	0.21	0.14	
Moved within last year	-0.31***	0.07	-0.31***	0.07	-0.33***	0.07	
Home ownership	0.20***	0.07	0.20***	0.07	0.19**	0.07	
Constant	0.07	0.17	0.08	0.17	0.06	0.18	
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	31,7	0.11	0.17	0.10	0.10	
N	4,958		4,958		4,958		

* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

▼Table 7

Note: Two-tailed significance tests were used. Robust standard errors adjusted for state clustering are reported. The CPS population weights were used. **Source:** Heritage Foundation calculations.

Non-Hispanic African–Americans. The probit regression results presented in Table 7 contain data for respondents reporting to be non-Hispanic African–Americans. Models 12 and 13 present the findings for the maximum requirements with Model 13 including the correct voter identification classifications for Arizona and Illinois. Except for the non-photo identification coefficient, none of the coefficients for the voter identification variables are statistically different from zero. In both Models 12 and 13, African–American respondents in non-photo identification states are less likely to have reported voting compared to African–American respondents

in states that only required voters to say their names at the polling stations. In Model 12, African–American respondents in non-photo identification states are 0.019 percent less likely to report voting than African–American respondents from states that only required voters to state their name. For Model 13, the elasticity for non-photo identification states is 0.012 percent.

The analysis of minimum voter identification requirements in Model 14 fails to find any statistically significant relationships between African—American voter turnout and the minimum voting requirements.

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		Maximum R		·	Minimum R	equirement
	Mode		Mode		Mod	
	Vercellotti		Recoded			Categories
Variable	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.I
Sign name	-0.27	0.14	-0.11	0.18	-0.21	0.14
Match signature	-0.16	0.14	0.03	0.18	-0.16	0.14
Non-photo ID	-0.44**	0.15	-0.35*	0.18	-0.40*	0.15
Photo ID	-0. 2	0.16	-0.02	0.18		
Affidavit					-0.16	0.16
Age 25-44	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08
Age 45–64	0.38***	0.07	0.39***	0.07	0.39***	0.07
Age 65+	0.40**	0.12	0.40***	0.12	0.41***	0.12
High school	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.07
Some college	0.44***	0.04	0.43***	0.04	0.44***	0.04
College	0.53***	0.10	0.52***	0.10	0.53***	0.10
Graduate school	0.78***	0.20	0.78***	0.20	0.78***	0.20
amily income, \$15,000-\$29,999	0.12	0.08	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.08
Family income, \$30,000–\$49,999	0.01	0.15	0.001	0.15	0.01	0.15
Family income, \$50,000–\$74,999	0.21**	0.08	0.20**	0.07	0.21**	0.08
Family income, \$75,000–\$149,999	0.40***	0.10	0.39***	0.09	0.40***	0.10
Family income, \$150,000 or more	0.09	0.16	80.0	0.16	0.09	0.16
Married	-0.12	0.08	-0.11	0.08	-0.12	0.08
Widowed	-0.40***	0.13	-0.40***	0.13	-0.4 ***	0.13
Divorced	-0.14	0.11	-0.13	0.11	-0.14	0.11
Seperated	-0.00	0.10	-0.003	0.10	-0.01	0.10
- emale	0.16***	0.04	0.16***	0.04	0.16***	0.04
Battleground state	0.41***	0.08	0.39***	0.08	0.42***	0.08
Competitive race	-0.29**	0.11	-0.23**	0.11	-0.25*	0.11
mployed	-0.17	0.09	-0.17	0.10	-0.18	0.09
Member of workforce	-0.11	0.09	-0.11	0.10	-0.12	0.09
Vative-born citizen	-0.26***	0.08	-0.25***	0.08	-0.27***	0.08
Moved within last year	-0.26***	0.07	-0.26***	0.07	-0.27***	0.07
Home ownership	0.32***	0.04	0.34***	0.05	0.31***	0.04
Constant	0.53**	0.19	0.38	0.20	0.51**	0.19
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	0.,,	0.11	0.20	0.11	0117
V	2,862		2,862		2,862	

Hispanics. The probit regression results presented in Table 8 contain data for respondents reporting to be Hispanic. Models 15 and 16 present the findings for the maximum requirements with Model 16 including the correct voter identification classifications for Arizona and Illinois. Model 17 presents the findings for the minimum voter identification requirements. All three models find that Hispanics reported lower voter turnout rates in states with non-photo identification requirements compared to states that only require voters to state their names at the polling stations. All three of these findings are statistically significant at the 95

percent confidence level. Hispanic respondents in non-photo identification states are 0.035 percent to 0.049 percent less likely to report voting than Hispanic respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.

Asian Americans. The probit regression results presented in Table 9 contain data for respondents reporting to be non-Hispanic Asian American (including Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders). Models 18 and 19 present the findings for the maximum requirements with Model 19 including the correct voter identification classifications for Arizona and Illinois. Model 20 presents the findings for the

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Alternative	Specifications	of Probit Models	of Voter Turnout of Asia	nc
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		Minimum Requirement					
	Mode	el 18	Mode	el 19	Mod	el 20	
	Vercellotti :	Vercellotti Categories		d States	Vercellotti Categories		
Variable	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	Coefficient	Robust S.E.	
Sign name	-0.19	0.19	-0.22	0.28	-0.20	0.19	
Match signature	0.14	0.19	0.06	0.29	0.10	0.19	
Non-photo ID	-0.28	0.21	-0.33	0.29	-0.30	0.21	
Photo ID	-0.09	0.21	-0.13	0.29			
Affidavit					0.19	0.21	
Age 25–44	-0.39**	0.15	-0.39**	0.15	-0.37*	0.15	
Age 45–64	-0.04	0.19	0.03	0.19	-0.005	0.19	
Age 65+	-0.001	0.32	-0.005	0.32	-0.04	0.32	
High school	0.46	0.28	0.47	0.28	0.47	0.28	
Some college	0.21	0.43	0.21	0.43	0.22	0.43	
College	0.42	0.33	0.42	0.33	0.42	0.33	
Graduate school	0.39	0.37	0.39	0.37	0.39	0.37	
Family income, \$15,000-\$29,999	-0.06	0.24	-0.06	0.25	-0.05	0.24	
Family income, \$30,000-\$49,999	-0.37	0.19	-0.36	0.19	-0.35	0.19	
Family income, \$50,000-\$74,999	-0.30	0.23	-0.30	0.23	-0.29	0.23	
Family income, \$75,000-\$149,999	0.26	0.23	0.27	0.24	0.25	0.23	
Family income, \$150,000 or more	0.09	0.26	0.09	0.27	0.10	0.26	
Married	0.36*	0.18	0.36*	0.18	0.34	0.18	
Widowed	-0.43	0.32	-0.43	0.32	-0.43	0.32	
Divorced	0.13	0.23	0.12	0.23	0.08	0.23	
Seperated	0.19	0.41	0.18	0.41	0.15	0.41	
Female	0.13	0.07	0.14***	0.07	0.13	0.07	
Battleground state	0.23	0.13	0.24	0.13	0.17	0.13	
Competitive race	0.30	0.21	0.30	0.20	0.21	0.21	
Employed	-0.28	0.37	-0.28	0.37	-0.28	0.37	
Member of workforce	0.59	0.43	0.59	0.43	0.58	0.43	
Native-born citizen	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.14	
Moved within last year	-0.41**	0.13	-0.42***	0.13	-0.45***		
Home ownership '	-0.09	0.10	-0.09	0.10	-0.11	0.10	
Constant	0.40	0.48	0.44	0.55	0.46	0.48	
Pseudo R-squared	0.11		0.11		0.10		
N	1,029		1,029		1,029		
			•		•		

^{*} p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Note: Two-tailed significance tests were used. Robust standard errors adjusted for state clustering are reported. The CPS population weights were used. **Source:** Heritage Foundation calculations.

minimum voter identification requirements. All three models find that the various state voter identification requirements do not have a statistically measurable relationship with voter turnout of Asian Americans.

DISCUSSION

▼Table 9

The findings of this analysis suggest that voter identification requirements, such as requiring non-photo and photo identification, have virtually no suppressive effect on reported voter turnout.

Caution is needed in interpreting the Eagleton Institute's findings, for at least three reasons.

First, their study used one-tailed significance tests that can be used to double the chances of finding statistically significant findings.

Second, the voter identification laws for two states, Arizona and Illinois, were incorrectly classified. From our modeling, this misclassification leads to a negative and statistically significant relationship between photo identification requirements and voter turnout for all registered voters. When Arizona and Illinois are correctly classified, the relationship in our modeling is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Third, the findings for photo identification requirements are sensitive to model specification. Us-

тх_**201**01808 **JA_00456**7 ing the Eagleton Institute's state voter identification classifications and controlling for marriage with a married or not dichotomous variable, our analysis of overall voter turnout finds that photo identification requirements have a negative and statistically significant relationship with overall voter turnout. However, when additional marital status variables—widowed, divorced, separated—are included, the statistically significant relationship for photo identification requirements disappears.

Controlling for factors that influence voter turnout, states with stricter voter identification laws largely do not have the claimed negative impact on voter turnout when compared to states with more lenient voter identification laws. Based on the Eagleton Institute's findings, some members of the media have claimed that voter identification law suppress voter turnout, especially among minorities. Their conclusion is unfounded. When statistically significant and negative relationships are found in our analysis, the effects are so small that the findings offer little policy significance.

More important, minority respondents in states that required photo identification are just as likely to report voting as are minority respondents from states that only required voters to say their name.

Nevertheless, using data from the November 2004 CPS to study the impact of voter identification requirements on voter turnout does have its limitations. The November 2004 CPS is a cross-sectional data set that does not allow social scientists to estimate the effect of changing voter identification requirements within states over time. Studies using the November CPS can only provide information on how voter patterns differed between states with different voter identification requirements. These studies cannot provide information on how enacting stiffer voter identification requirements will affect voter turnout within states over time. While it is reasonable to assume that voters will respond to stricter voter identification requirements by obtaining the necessary documentation, we would need to use panel data sets that consist of cross-sectional and time-series data in order to conduct such an analysis. Panel studies observe multiple units (e.g., individual

voters, voting precincts, and counties) over several time periods.

To the best of our knowledge, there is only one voter identification study that utilizes the benefits of panel data. The study, by John R. Lott of the University of Maryland Foundation, analyzed the effect of stricter voter identification requirements on U.S. primary and general elections from 1996 to 2006. B1 Dr. Lott found little support for the notion that nonphoto and photo identification requirements suppress voter turnout.

As states adopt stricter voter identification requirements to deter voter fraud, future research needs to adopt panel data methods to determine how the laws affect voter turnout.

CONCLUSION

Controlling for factors that influence voter turnout, voter identification laws largely do not have the claimed negative impact on voter turnout based on state-to-state comparisons. When statistically significant and negative relationships are found, the effects are so small that the findings offer little policy significance. White survey respondents in photo identification states are 0.002 percent less likely to report voting than white respondents from states that only required voters to state their name. African–American respondents in non-photo identification states are 0.012 percent less likely to report voting than African–American respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.

In other cases, no effect was found. In general, respondents in photo identification and non-photo identification states are *just as likely* to report voting compared to respondents from states that only required voters to state their name. African—American respondents in photo identification states are *just as likely* to report voting compared to African—American respondents from states that only required voters to state their name. Hispanic respondents in photo identification states are *just as likely* to report voting compared to Hispanic respondents from states that only required voters to state their name.

—David B. Muhlhausen, Ph.D., is a Senior Policy Analyst and Keri Weber Sikich is a research assistant in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation.

^{80.} Baxter and Galloway, "Wonk Alert: Study Says the Heavier the Voter ID Requirements, the Lower Turnout"; Wolf, "Study: Stricter Voting ID Rules Hurt '04 Turnout"; and Zweifel, "Voter ID Reducing Minority Turnout."

^{81.} Lott, "Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud Have on Voter Participation Rates."